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ABSTRACT

In the 1803 The Schooner Charming Betsy case, Chief Justice
Marshall announced a canon of interpretation that "anact of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the laws of nations if any other
possible construction remains."The Charming Betsy canon has become

as venerable as its name is felicitous: as recently as 1988 the Supreme
Court noted that the doctrine "hasfor so long been applied by this Court
that it is beyond debate."
After exploring the traditional justifications for Charming Betsy,

this Article proposes that the canon should be justified, not just by
Congressional intent or separation of powers, but by our desire to
promote "ruleof law"globally. Based on this justification for the canon,
the Article reasons that it should be applied more vigorously in relation

to legal norms established by treaty than in relation to customary
international law. The Article also proposes a nuanced relationship
between the Charming Betsy canon and another key interpretative tool
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of American courts, the Chevron doctrine. Finally, the Article explores
whether and how Charming Betsy should be brought to bear in trade
disputes where Congress has crafted special rules for recognition and
implementation of WTO decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The 2016 election brought to the US presidency a person who
publicly questioned, criticized, and attacked the post-1945
international order more than any major American political leader
since, well, 1945. This relentlessly harsh rhetoric against the
international status quo was combined with only a few blatant
defections from the United States' international legal commitments-

the best-known examples being the US withdrawal from the Paris
climate accords and the Iran nuclear deal as well as the massive tariffs
imposed in the trade dispute with China (in violation of our World
Trade Organization [WTO] tariff bindings). But away from the
headlines, any executive branch intent on disrupting the status quo,
especially in defense of American sovereignty, should be expected to
try to chip away at the United States' compliance with its international
legal obligations.

In that context, one of the judiciary's best tools to defend American
compliance with international law is the Charming Betsy canon.
Arguably the most felicitously named doctrine in an American judge's

toolbox, the 1804 Charming Betsy canon says that federal statutes
"ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."1 For over two centuries, this principle

for the interplay of domestic-and international law has been "a rule of
statutory construction sustained by an unbroken line of authority, 2 a
canon "deeply embedded in American jurisprudence," 3 and "the
bedrock for a series of later decisions involving international law and
judicial construction." 4 In the words of the Supreme Court, Charming
Betsy "has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond

debate." 5
Yet the Charming Betsy canon exists in a radically changed
world-a world in which the doctrine unquestionably has more

coverage and arguably is under more stress. It may be an exaggeration
to say that "globalization makes everything international,"6 but "wellknown developments have radically increased the number of cases that

1.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
2.
United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). Of course, the court in 1988 could only say "for over a century and a half." Id.
3.

Note, The Charming Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and Customary

InternationalLaw, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 HARV. L. REV.
Note]. See also Curtis A. Bradley, The CharmingBetsy Canonand Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the InterpretativeRole of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 536 (1998)
("The Charming Betsy canon has, to date, been largely uncontested.") [hereinafter
Bradley, CharmingBetsy].
4.
Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of InternationalLegisprudence,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 213 (1993).
5.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr., 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
6.
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, InternationalLaw, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 567, 578 (2000).
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7
and everyone agrees that
directly implicate foreign relations"
substantive matters
"address
increasingly
norms
legal
international
to exclusive
reserved
traditionally
life
of our political and economic
8 In 2016, Justice Stephen Breyer published a
jurisdiction."
domestic

book dedicated to exploring the issues and challenges of a world in
which our Supreme Court "must increasingly consider foreign and

domestic law together, as if they constituted parts of a broadly
interconnected legal web." 9
Simply put, in an era in which there are international legal norms

on everything from children's education to chloroflourocarbons, a
doctrine that says that federal statutes "ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations" is more and more likely to conflict with other

interpretative canons, including the Chevron doctrine's deference to
agency determinations. All this was true before the American people
elected a president bent on reshaping, challenging, or sometimes
ignoring our country's international obligations. Many of these actions
by the Trump administration have been either within the ambit of

executive power or so contrary to domestic statutory law that
international legal obligations have little role to play. But Charming
Betsy remains a valuable judicial tool to address some of the mischief
when executive branch officials attempt to ignore international
obligations in the context of ambiguous congressional direction.
This Article offers a new explanationfor CharmingBetsy separate
from what has been emphasized in the legal scholarship: that the
Charming Betsy canon manifests concerns for a variation of the "rule
of law," what we might call "global rule of law." Part I of this Article
walks through the Charming Betsy jurisprudence, from the original
1803 dispute through the canon's current use to interpret the

substantive content of federal laws. Part I also proposes that Charming

7.
YALE L.J.
8.
Statutory

Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, DisregardingForeignRelations Law, 116
1230, 1258 (2007).
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw As a Canon of Domestic
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1111 (1990) (observing the changes in

international law toward more norms governing more subjects are universal). See also

Sarah H. Cleveland, Our InternationalConstitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 92 (2006)
("[I]nternational law has evolved to address new areas of domestic economic, social, and

political life . . . international law now is arguably relevant to more, and different,
constitutional questions than in the past."); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate
Over CustomaryInternationalLaw, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 420 (2002); Gerald L. Neuman,
The Nationalizationof Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1649 (1999);
Paul B. Stephan, The New InternationalLaw-Legitimacy, Accountability, and Freedom
in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1556-57 (1999); Yasmin Ahmed,
Why Every Aspiring Lawyer Should Study InternationalLaw, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2015,
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/apr/08/aspiring-lawyersAM),
4:53
international-law [ https://perma.cc/FHZ3-2QN5] (archived July 11, 2020) (quoting
lawyer Robert Volterra, "[t]here are treaties regulating almost every human activity,
including child custody, the content of breakfast cereals, and what compensation
travellers receive if an airline loses luggage[.]".
STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 91 (2016).
9.
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Betsy is best understood as a "coordinating" canon for different levels
or sources of law rather than as part of "comity" analysis, as suggested
by some commentators and court opinions. Part II then discusses the

traditional congressional intent and separation of powers explanations
of the canon and proposes that an equally significant foundation for

the canon is the defense and advancement of the rule of law globally.
Of course, "rule of law is a notoriously plastic concept," 10 so Part II will
explain what is meant here by global rule of law.
Building from this alternative understanding of the Charming
Betsy canon, Part III proposes that the canon should have more robust
application with treaty-based legal norms than with customary
international law; Part IV explores the relationship between Charming

Betsy and the Chevron doctrine; and Part V takes up the specific
problem of the proper use of Charming Betsy in relation to WTO
decisions. It is easy to imagine either of these last two topics becoming
a flashpoint in litigation anytime an administration claims what is in
the best interests of the country is to ignore existing international
obligations.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE CHARMING BETSY DOCTRINE
The dispute in Murray v. The Schooner CharmingBetsy concerned

application of the 1800 Non-Intercourse Act, a law promulgated in a
period of undeclared hostilities at sea with France.11 The Act
prohibited commercial transactions "between any person or persons
resident within the United States or under their protection, and any
person or persons resident within the territories of the French

Republic, or any of the dependencies thereof."12 A vessel used to violate
the prohibition was subject to forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation if
that vessel was "owned, hired, or employed wholly or in part" by a US
citizen or resident.13

In July 1801, the schooner CharmingBetsy was seized by the crew
of the U.S.S. Constellation under the command of Captain Alexander
Murray. The seized ship had been built in the United States; it had
initially been owned by American citizens, but had just been sold in St.

10.

Matthew Stephenson, A Trojan Horse in China?, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF

LAW ABROAD: IN SEARcH OF KNOWLEDGE 191, 196 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
11.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 79 (1804). See generally
ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE
UNDEcLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801 (1966).

12. Murray, 6 U.S. at 77; Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10 § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 10.
13. Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10 § 1 ("[A]ny ship or vessel, owned, hired, or
employed wholly or in part by any person or persons resident within the United States,
or any citizen or citizens thereof resident elsewhere . . . shall be wholly forfeited, and
may be seized and condemned. . ..").
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Thomas-then a Danish possession 1 4- to one Jared Shattuck. With a
new cargo purchased by Shattuck and flying under a Danish flag, the

ship had set sail in late June for the French island of Guadeloupe.
Upon boarding the CharmingBetsy, Captain Murray learned that

Shattuck had been born in Connecticut 15 and reasonably concluded
that the ship was actually American. Murray seized the Charming
Betsy, disposed of its perishable cargo, and sent the ship to
Philadelphia for adjudication under the Non-Intercourse Act. But in
Philadelphia, the Danish consul sought recovery of the ship as the

property of a Danish subject. 16 Although Jared Shattuck had been born
7
in the United States, he had moved "while an infant"1 to St. Thomas.
There he had grown up, apprenticed, married, carried on trade as a

Danish subject, "became a Danishburgher,"1 8 and had "taken the oath
of allegiance to the crown of Denmark in 1797."19 Both the district

court and the court of appeals concluded that the facts as a whole
constituted "proof of expatriation" and that Shattuck was "bona fide a
Danish adopted subject."2 0
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall avoided the
citizenship issue, 2 ' focusing instead on the Non-Intercourse Act's
broader prohibition of commerce "between any person or persons
resident within the United States or under their protection" and
France.2 2 For Justice Marshall, the "whole combination" of facts

"certainly place[d Shattuck] out of the protection of the United States
while within the territory of the sovereign to whom he has sworn

allegiance, and consequently t[ook] him out of the description of the
act."2 3 To galvanize this interpretation, Marshall relied on the
principle that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
24
the laws of nations if any other possible construction remains." The

Court believed that any other interpretation of the Non-Intercourse

14.
See A Brief History of the Danish West Indies, 1666-1917, VIRGIN ISLANDS
HISTORY, http://www.virgin-islands-history.dk/eng/vi_hist.asp (last visited Sept. 19,
2020) [https://perma.ccIY2BH-QBZE] (archived Sept. 19, 2020) (describing how the
Danish crown controlled St. Thomas from 1754 until the island's sale to the United
States in 1917 as part of what became the U.S. Virgin Islands).
15.
See Murray, 6 U.S. at 66.
16.
See id. at 116.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 66.
19. Id. at 116.
20. Id. at 68. See Frederick C. Leiner, The Charming Betsy and the Marshall
Court, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2001) (setting out a fuller, enjoyable tale of the schooner
Charming Betsy before, during, and after the litigation).
See Murray, 6 U.S. at 120.
21.
22. Id. at 118.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
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Act might "violate neutral rights, or affect neutral commerce" contrary
to customary international law.25
In the two centuries since, the Supreme Court has never wavered
in its adherence to Charming Betsy and the canon has become
enshrined in a significant, if patchy, body of case law. Indeed, it might
be said that Charming Betsy has had multiple personalities or been
used as a moniker for two, perhaps three, different canons. First,
CharmingBetsy has been considered the source of a canon limiting the
extraterritorial application of domestic US laws, a canon which has
effectively spun off from it. Nowadays, Charming Betsy is more
properly identified as an interpretative canon to align the substantive
content of American law with the United States' commitments in
international law. The 1803 decision effectively did both these things,
using the law of nations to bolster a substantive interpretation of US
statutory law to find that the statute did not reach Jared Shattuck,
who lived in "the territory of [a foreign] sovereign to whom he has

sworn allegiance." Let us consider each of these distinct canons-as
well as a third, questionable use of Marshall's original opinion.

A. Charming Betsy as a Limit on ExtraterritorialApplication of Laws
A pair of mid-twentieth century cases, Lauritzen v. Larsen2 6 and

McCulloch

v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,27

reinforced CharmingBetsy as a tool to limit the reach of American law.
In an echo of the Charming Betsy facts, the 1953 Lauritzen decision
addressed whether the federal cause of action for "any seaman who
shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment" extended
to a Danish seaman who had been hired in the United States but
negligently injured on a Danish ship in Cuban waters. Reversing the
lower courts, the Supreme Court concluded that US shipping and
maritime laws, although written in broad and general terms, should be
"construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which American
law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of
international law." 28

A decade later, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de

25.
Indeed, this resolution of the case critically depended on the lack of a declared
war between the US and France because the Danish were not obligated to curb trade
with either Americans or French, i.e., "neutrals are not bound to take notice of hostilities
between two nations, unless war has been declared." Id. at 70. Three years earlier

Marshall had announced a similar, if arguably more vague, principle. In Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 43 (1801), the Court concluded that a broad interpretation of a salvage
statute would be contrary to "the common principles and usages of nations" and that "the
laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so be construed as to infract the
common principles and usages of nations."
26.
See generally Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
27.
See generally McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372
U.S. 10 (1963).
28.
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 577.
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question of the application of

American law to a foreign-flagged ship.

Confronting the question

whether the National Labor Relations Act "as written was intended to
have any application to foreign-registered vessels employing alien

seamen," the Court concluded that the statute did not apply to a vessel
flying a Honduran flag, even if the vessel was owned by the Honduran

subsidiary of an American corporation and was going back and forth
between the two countries.2 9 The Court based its decision on "the wellestablished rule of international law that the law of the flag state
30
ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship" as well as the 1927
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights between
Honduras and the United States. 31 In other words, the CharmingBetsy
doctrine in McCulloch applied both to customary international law and

to treaty obligations.
While lower courts have used CharmingBetsy in the same way, 32
questions regarding the international reach of US domestic law are

now usually resolved under a distinct line of cases establishing a
presumption against extraterritorial application of US domestic
statutes, i.e., "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."33 This interpretative presumption "rests on the
perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic,
not foreign,

matters." 34 The interpretative

presumption

against

extraterritorial application of domestic statutes avoids any need to

The National Maritime Union of America (AFL-CIO) had contended that the
29.
case was different than the earlier because "here there is a fleet of vessels not
temporarily in United States waters but operating in a regular course of trade between
foreign ports and those of the United States; and, second, the foreign owner of the ships
is in turn owned by an American corporation." McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 18-19.
Id. at 20-21.
30.
31.
See id. at 21 n.12 ("Article X of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Consular Rights between Honduras and the United States, 45 Stat. 2618 (1927), provides
that merchant vessels flying the flags and having the papers of either country 'shall, both
within the territorial waters of the other High Contracting Party and on the high seas,
be deemed to be the vessels of the Party whose flag is flown."').
32.
See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 356 F.3d 641, 646-48 (5th Cir.
2004), rev'd on other grounds, 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (limiting the reach of the Americans
with Disabilities Act pursuant to U.S. obligations under the International Convention
for Safety of Life at Sea); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (narrowly construing general language in the FTC Act as to
methods to serve compulsory process abroad); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.
Supp. 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (interpreting Marijuana on the High Seas Act to
prohibit marijuana possession only where U.S. jurisdiction could be asserted under
customary international law).

33.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (quoting Foley); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating
the presumption against extraterritorial application as quoted above); United States v.
Garcia Soto, 948 F.3d 356, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (discussing presumption "that American
laws do not apply outside of the United States-unless Congress directs otherwise").
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
34.
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consider whether there are relevant international legal norms and
whether the domestic statute has a "possible construction" to line up
with those norms.3 5
B. Charming Betsy as a Tool for Substantive Interpretation
Meanwhile Justice Marshall's admonition that federal statutes
"ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains" became a vehicle to use international
law for substantive interpretation of US domestic law. This
understanding of CharmingBetsy was galvanized in modern times by
the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Weinberger v. Rossi3 6 concerning
a 1971 law enacted by Congress to bar discrimination against
Americans in hiring for civilian jobs at US military bases overseas. The
law was passed in the wake of a US Army memorandum "encouraging

the recruitment and hiring of local nationals instead of United States
citizens" at stores on US bases in Germany.3 7 The statutory
provision-section 106-read as follows:
Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the
Department of Defense ... in the employment of civilian personnel at any facility
or installation operated by the Department of Defense in any foreign country
because such person is a citizen of the United States or is a dependent of a
38
member of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Prior to the passage of this legislation, the President had entered into
13 executive agreements with countries hosting US military bases
providing for preferential employment of local nationals in civilian jobs

at the US bases. Subsequent to the 1971 law, "four more such
agreements ha[d] been concluded."39
The question before the Weinberger court was substantive
interpretation of the phrase "[u]nless prohibited by treaty." Did it
mean only Article II treaties ratified by the US Senate, or did it include
all executive agreements with foreign sovereigns that would be
considered "treaties" under international law?4 0 The former

35.
In keeping with that, judges across the political spectrum from Thurgood
Marshall to Antonin Scalia have viewed the presumption against extraterritoriality as
entirely distinct from the presumption in favor of international law. See Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the two
as "wholly independent"); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 264.
36.
See generally Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
37.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 28-29 (emphasis in original).
38.
39.
Id. at 32. The particular executive agreement at issue in Weinberger v. Rossi
was a 1968 "Base Labor Agreement" with the Philippines related to the U.S. Navy base
at Subic Bay. Id. at 27-28.
40.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES pt. 1, ch. 1, introductory note 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)] (defining a treaty as a "purposeful agreement among states").
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interpretation of "treaty" would mean that Congress "must have
intended to repudiate these executive agreements,"4 1 putting the
United States out of compliance with 17 bilateral obligations.

The Court concluded that Congress had not consistently used the
word "treaty" to refer only to Article II treaties and had, on occasion,
42
clearly used the word to refer to executive agreements; this gave the

Court multiple "possible interpretations" to which it could apply the
43
The Court
Charming Betsy "maxim of statutory construction."

unanimously "conclude[d] that the 'treaty' exception in the statute
extended to executive agreements as well as to Art. II treaties,""
ensuring

that Congress's

international obligations

1971 law

conflicted neither

undertaken before

with the

1971 nor the four

commitments undertaken after the law's passage.

Just a few years after Weinberger, the Restatement (Third) of
United States Foreign Relations Law expressed the doctrine in words

that track Justice Marshall but expands it to include all public
international law:
Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United
45
States.

The Restatement Third tweaks Marshall's interpretative standard
("fairly possible")4 6 while also clarifying that the canon-couched in the
nineteenth century idea of the "law of nations"-applies to both
customary international law and the specific international legal
obligations that the United States undertakes through agreements.

In this spirit, lower courts have relied on CharmingBetsy to sculpt
their substantive interpretations of ambiguous statutes. For example,

in its 1981 Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson 47 decision, the Tenth
Circuit based its substantive interpretation of federal immigration
laws on international legal principles. The issue before the court was

Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 31.
41.
See id. at 30-31. There was also no evidence in the legislative history of this
42.
particular provision to point to a meaning of "treaty" limited to Article II treaties.
Instead, "the brief congressional debates on this provision indicate that Congress was
not concerned with limiting the authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements with [a] host country, but with the ad hoc decisionmaking of military
commanders overseas." Id. at 33.

43.
Id. at 32.
44.
Id. at 36.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 40, § 114.
45.
Chief Justice Marshall had said "any other possible construction," so at least
46.
one commentator has offered that the Restatement language ('fairly possible') "is more
diluted than the Chief Justice's statement." PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 149 F.R.D. 245,

258 (1992) (remarks of Leonard M. Shambon).
47.
See generally Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1981).
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whether or not ambiguous provisions on "excludable aliens" could be

read "to permit indefinite detention as an alternative to exclusion." 4 8
The court said no, adopting a statutory construction "consistent with
accepted international law principles that individuals are entitled to
be free of arbitrary imprisonment."4 9 On this basis, the court held that
Rodriguez-Fernandez should be released.5 0 In 2001, a Ninth Circuit
panel similarly held that immigration laws did not "authorize
detention of an alien, pending removal, indefinitely" 51 both to avoid
Constitutional issues and to comply with "'a clear international
prohibition' ... against prolonged and arbitrary detention."5 2
At the same time-and unlike the presumption against

extraterritorial application of domestic statutes-the CharmingBetsy
canon does not always point toward a narrow interpretation of
domestic law.5 3 In decisions a decade apart, the D.C. Circuit and
Second Circuit construed the statutory phrase "found in the United
States" broadly in order to fulfill the United States' obligations under
two different treaties5 4 obliging the United States to assert jurisdiction

over any airline hijacker "present in" the country. 55
Other sophisticated jurisdictions deploy a similar interpretative
principle in their jurisprudence. According to the Court of Justice of
the European Union, "EU legislation must, moreover, so far as
possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with

48.
Id. at 1389.
49.
Id. at 1390. Rodriguez-Fernandez had been serving a felony prison term in
Cuba before arriving in the U.S. as one of the Cuban "boat people" in the 1980s; as a
felon, he was an "excludable alien." Id. at 1384.
50.
Id. at 1390 (holding that "the burden is upon the government to show that the
detention is still temporary pending expulsion, and not simply incarceration as an
.

alternative to departure")

51.
Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2001).
52.
Id. at 1114 (quoting Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th
Cir. 1998)). In the Kim Ho Ma case, the court seemed to rely on both a norm of customary
international law against prolonged and arbitrary detention and, separately, the United
States obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). The court commented "[g]iven the strength of the rule of international law
[against prolonged detentions], our construction of the statute renders it consistent with

the CharmingBetsy rule." Id.
53.
See generally United States v. Garcia Soto, 948 F.3d 356, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
("[T]he Charming Betsy [doctrine] is different from the presumption against
extraterritoriality.")
54.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,

22 U.S.T. 1643, 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 [hereinafter 1971 Montreal Convention].
55.
See United States v. Prado, 933 F.3d 121, 137 n.8 (2d Cir. 2019); United States
v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 90 (2d Cir. 2003) (same interpretation of "found in the United
States" in relation to parallel "present in" language in 1971 Montreal Convention);
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Congress intended
the statutory term 'found in the United States' to parallel the Hague Convention's
'present in [a contracting state's] territory,' a phrase which does not indicate the
voluntariness limitation urged by Yunis.").
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international law." 5 6 In 1908, Australian High Court Justice Richard
O'Connor declared "every statute is to be interpreted and applied so far
as its language admits so as not to be inconsistent with the comity of
57
nations or with the established rules of international law;" the Indian

Supreme Court considers that it is "well accepted that in construing
any provision in domestic legislation which is ambiguous, in the sense

that it is capable of more than one meaning, the meaning which
conforms most closely to the provisions of any international instrument
is to be preferred"; 58 and in New Zealand, "it has become established

in recent years that there is a presumption that Parliament intends to
59
legislate consistently with international obligations."

56.
Case C-263/18, Nederlands Uitgeversverbond v. Tom Kabinet Internet BV,
2019 E.C.R. 38 ("EU legislation must, moreover, so far as possible, be interpreted in a
manner that is consistent with international law, in particular where its provisions are
intended specifically to give effect to an international agreement concluded by the
European Union"); Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana v.
Rafael Hoteles SA, 2016 E.C.R. 1-11519, ¶ 35 ("Community legislation must, so far as
possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law, in
particular where its provisions are intended specifically to give effect to an international
agreement concluded by the Community....").
Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners'Ass'n (1908) 6 CLR 309,
57.
363 (Austl.). See generally Michael Kirby, The Growing Impact of InternationalLaw on
the Common Law, 33 ADEL. L. REV. 7 (2012) (highlighting the complexity in Australia as
it relates to the relationship between international legal norms and the interpretation of
the common law).
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 1136 (India)
58.
("This Court has relied upon them for statutory interpretation, where the terms of any
legislation are not clear or are reasonably capable of more than one meaning. In such
cases, the courts have relied upon the meaning which is in consonance with the treaties,
for there is a prima facie presumption that Parliament did not intend to act in breach of
international law, including State treaty obligations. It is also well accepted that in
construing any provision in domestic legislation which is ambiguous, in the sense that it
is capable of more than one meaning, the meaning which conforms most closely to the
provisions of any international instrument is to be preferred, in the absence of any
domestic law to the contrary.").
59.
Susan Glazebrook, Do They Say What They Mean and Mean What They Say?,
OTAGO L. REV. 61, 82 (2015). See Sellers v. Maritime Safety Inspector (1999) 2 NZLR 44
(N.Z.) (finding that authority of Director of Maritime Safety to require safety equipment
on ships had to be interpreted to be consistent with United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea). In 1988, a Bangalore, India meeting of Commowealth jurists (and then
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg as the one American attendee) concluded "there is a growing
tendency for national courts to have regard to these international [legal] norms for the
purposes of deciding cases where the domestic law - whether constitutional, statute, or
common law - is uncertain or incomplete." Kirby, supra note 57, at 24; P.N. Bhagwati,
Chairman, Concluding Statement at the Fourth Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic
Application of International Human Rights Norms in Bangalore, India (Feb. 24, 1988),
https://read.thecommonwealth-ilibrary.org/commonwealth/governance/developinghuman-rights-jurisprudence/the-bangalore-principles_9781848594968-18-en#page1
[https://perma.cc/G5QP-WZBN] (archived July 28, 2020).
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C. A Comity Doctrine or a Canon of Coordination?
Courts and commentators sometimes describe the Charming
Betsy canon as a "comity" doctrine. 60 For example, Eric Posner and
Cass Sunstein put the canon in a category of "comity doctrines" which
they consider a subset of what they call "international relations
doctrines."61 But identifying Charming Betsy as a "comity" doctrine
oversimplifies the matter. Comity operates as a norm when a court
finds that it has jurisdiction, but concludes that there are prudential
reasons to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction based on the
concurrent jurisdiction of another nation. In cases where Charming

Betsy was used to curtail the jurisdictional reach of a domestic statute,
the court concludes that the US law does not reach the activity in
question, period. In many cases where Charming Betsy is used to
interpret the substance of American law-from asylum cases to

intellectual property disputes-no other country has jurisdiction over
the matter. The practical result is the same, but the reasoning is
different. While comity and CharmingBetsy can both be said to involve
respect for the international order, comity is better understood as a

matter of respect for another sovereign and its immediate interests
while CharmingBetsy is better understood as respect for international
law and the collective, long-term interests of the international
community.

Of course, it is easy to meld the two. Writing for the Court in 2004,
Justice Breyer noted that the "Court ordinarily construes ambiguous
statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations" and, citing Charming Betsy, noted that
"[t]his rule of construction reflects principles of customary
international law-law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily

seeks to follow." 6 2 Choosing an interpretation of US domestic law to
"avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations"6 3 sounds like a comity analysis, but to the degree that there is
a customary international legal norm that each sovereign has a

60.
See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815-17 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
delivering opinion in part; dissenting in part); United States v. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp.
2d 219, 241 (D.D.C. 2013); FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (blending a Charming Betsy analysis with a comity
analysis).

61.
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1170, 1173 (2007) (lumping the canon into a category of "comity doctrines"
which they consider a subset of what they call "international relations doctrines").
62.
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). See
also BREYER, supra note 9, at 102-03 (determining that "[c]ourts have long invoked
[comity] in case that present potential conflicts among the law of nations, because it is
reasonable to assume that Congress seeks to avoid such conflicts when possible.").
63.
Or, put another way, interpreting the domestic law in a way "less likely to
conflict directly with [domestic] regulations of other nations." Compagnie De SaintGobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1327.
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reasonable zone of enforcement of that sovereign's domestic laws and
deferring to another sovereign is necessary to respect that
international legal norm, then such a decision reflects both comity and

CharmingBetsy. If international law is agnostic as to who exercises
jurisdiction over a matter and a court still finds that resolution in

another sovereign's court is preferable, that decision is pure comity,
not CharmingBetsy.
As a doctrine to reconcile international and domestic law in a
certain range of circumstances, the proposal here is that Charming

Betsy is better understood as falling into a cluster of what might be
called canons of "coordination" or "accommodation" 64 similar to these
interpretative canons:

(a) statutes are presumed not to derogate from common law
principles; 65

(b) multiple statutory provisions are to be interpreted,
66
whenever possible, as consistent with each other;
(c) statutes are to be interpreted, whenever possible, as
67
consistent with the Constitution;

and
(d) Charming Betsy-statutes are to be interpreted, whenever
possible, as consistent with the United States' international
legal obligations.

Each of these doctrines "coordinate" different "levels" of our legal
system. In its own coordination function, Charming Betsy does not
require us to know the exact relationship between domestic and

Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 1124.
64.
See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 (2010) (recognizing "canon of
65.
construction that statutes should be interpreted consistently with the common law");
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) ("[W]here a common-law principle is well established ...
the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the
principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.");
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the
common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long
established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident.").
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
66.
(determining that, when considering different provisions of a statute, the court's
objective should be to "fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole"); FTC v.
Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959).
See Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)
67.
("[B]etween two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save
the Act."); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) ("[E]very reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.");
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1830) ("No court ought, unless the terms of an
act rendered it unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should involve a violation,
however unintentional, of the constitution.").
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international law; it only requires that one believe, as Steinhardt
notes, "that domestic and international law [should] be accommodated,
not necessarily as equals, but as two legitimate sources of norms
binding on the United States and enforceable in its courts."68 As long
as one accepts that international legal norms have some role in the
American legal system (without needing to agree on the precise role),
CharmingBetsy becomes a corollary of other "coordinating" canons.
Article VI of the Constitution expressly names "Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States" as part
of "the supreme Law of the Land." 69 So whatever the precise realm of
"Treaties," 70 application of Charming Betsy to a treaty obligation can
be understood as an accommodation mechanism to coordinate different
types of written "law of the land," i.e., as part and parcel of the doctrine
that statutes should be read as consistent whenever possible.
At this point, one might be drawn to the rich debate about selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties, that is, those treaties which
by their terms are directly enforceable by domestic courts versus those
treaties which require implementing legislation from Congress.7 1 But
this distinction need not have much practical importance when

mapping the impact of the Charming Betsy canon. Once a "non-selfexecuting" treaty has been ratified and its implementing legislation
passed into law, almost no one doubts that Charming Betsy would
properly apply in the interpretation of the implementing legislation

and any other relevant laws. Once a self-executing treaty has been
ratified by the Senate, again, almost no one doubts that Charming
Betsy would properly apply in the interpretation of any relevant, preexisting laws. The last scenario-the Senate ratifies a "non-self-

executing" treaty, but no implementing legislation is passed-is a fact

68.
Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 1106.
69.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land"). Article VI is one of four references to treaties in the Constitution; Article III
states that federal courts may hear cases arising under treaties. See id. art. III, § 2, cl.
1.
70.
It is reasonable to think that Article VI does not apply to executive or
executive/ legislative agreements that are not Senate-approved "treaties."
A debate that includes those who argue that the practice of declaring ratified
71.
treaties non-self executing facially violates Article VI of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 222 (1997); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of SenatorBricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 (1995) (suggesting
Senatorial claims that treaties are non-self-executing is unconstitutional); see generally
David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing A Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2002); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, NonSelf-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695,
695 (1995).
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pattern that just does not happen.72

While

customary

international

law

does

not

have

the

73
constitutional status of treaties, the notion that "the law of nations"

is part of Anglo-Saxon common law was embraced in both Blackstone's
Commentaries74 and numerous early Supreme Court opinions. Post-

Erie75 scholarly debate about the status of customary international law
(CIL) 76 did not erode the conventional wisdom that whatever federal
common law remains, customary international law should be treated

as part of it. 7 7 In 2004, a six-member majority of the Supreme Court

.

But even if there were non-self executing treaties for which there is no
72.
implementing legislation, Charming Betsy still applies if you find compelling the
argument that those treaties still "have the status of supreme federal law because the
Supremacy Clause grants them that status." Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President
Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 124 (2004).
Its only mention being that Congress has the power to "define and punish .
73.
Offenses against the Law of Nations." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
is
74.
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *67 ("the law of nations ...
here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of
the land.").
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (concluding that "[t]here
75.
is no general federal common law").

76.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 85253 (1997) (asserting that courts applying customary international law as federal common
law is inconsistent with Erie); Harold H. Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1835 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, State Law] (rebutting Bradley
and Goldsmith); see also Ingrid B. Wuerth, Authorization for the Use of Force,
InternationalLaw, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 299-300 (2005)
("The status of customary international law in our domestic legal system is contestedsome argue that it is federal law that binds the states and provides a basis for the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, others argue that it is not, and still others take an
intermediate position.").
77.
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 40, § 111 n.3 ("[T]he modern view is that
customary international law in the United States is federal law and its determination
by the federal courts is binding on the State courts."); Young, supra note 8, at 367 ("The
conventional wisdom has been that such law is (or is equivalent to) federal common law
for purposes of creating federal subject matter jurisdiction and preempting state law.");
see Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing "settled proposition
that federal common law incorporates international law"); In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
well settled
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is ...
that the law of nations is part of federal common law."). The U.S. Government has often
taken the position that customary international law is "federal law." See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No.
79-6090) ("[c]ustomary international law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively
by the federal courts"), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 606 n. 49 (1980); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos.
94-9035, 94-9069); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, 34-36, Republic
of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1969). These submissions are
discussed in Koh, State Law, supra note 76. Similarly, the Senate Report on the 1991
Torture Victim Protection Act states that "[i]nternational human rights cases
predictably raise legal issues--such as interpretations of international law--that are
matters of Federal common law and within the particular expertise of Federal courts."
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 6 n.6 (1991). See also Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law
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settled some of this debate, concluding that nothing since the founding

of the Republic "has categorically precluded federal courts from
recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common

law" and endorsing a "restrained conception" of new causes of action
based on specifically defined CIL norms. 78 This continued
understanding of CIL as common law makes Charming Betsy as
applied to a CIL part and parcel of the presumption that statutes
should not be interpreted to repudiate the common law.
While courts still do (and should) apply CharmingBetsy with both
types of international legal norms, Part III will propose that the

doctrine's application should be more robust with regards to norms
arising from treaty provisions than CIL norms. This follows from the
proposal in Part II that CharmingBetsy is justified in part as a tool to

promote the rule of law globally and to reinforce the post-World War II
global system the United States has pursued.

III. THE CHARMING BETSY CANON AS EMBODYING GLOBAL RULE OF
LAW

The Charming Betsy doctrine and its resilience are typically
explained with two justifications: (1) courts abiding by congressional
intent, and/or (2) courts sagely respecting separation of powers when
it comes to foreign affairs. But these explanations overlook a simpler
explanation for the canon: what should animate the Charming Betsy
canon is commitment to and promotion of the rule of law at the global

level.
Promotion of the rule of law through the canon happens on two
planes. First, if one believes that international legal norms are
legitimate sources of law in our domestic system and are integrated

in the United States, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1555, 1561 (1984) (stating that customary
international law has "the status of federal law for purposes of supremacy to state law").

78.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004) ("We assume, too, that
no development in the two centuries from the enactment of [the Alien Tort Statute] to
the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Filartigav. Pena-Irala,630 F.2d
876 (C.A.2 1980), has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim
under the law of nations as an element of common law; Congress has not in any relevant
way amended [the Alien Tort Statute] or limited civil common law power by another
statute. Still, there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a

federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind.
Accordingly, we think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized."). This tracks the view in at least some other common law jurisdictions.
See Glazebrook, supra note 59, at 84-85 ("It has long been accepted that customary
international law is automatically a part of the [New Zealand] common law as long as it
is not inconsistent with an Act of Parliament or with a prior judicial decision of final
authority.").
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into that system through federal common law and Article VI of the
Constitution, then the CharmingBetsy canon promotes the rule of law
domestically by promoting consistency and predictability among the
different sources of our domestic law. The canon reduces "dissonance"

among different sources of legal norms. But separate from that
reasoning, the CharmingBetsy canon should also be recognized for its
role in promoting the rule of law globally.
There is nothing in the federal judges' oath that prevents a judge
79
from seeking to promote the rule of law globally. And promotion of

the rule of law, in each society and across societies, should be a goal
shared by all members of the legal profession. In short, American

judges should promote the strengthening of the rule of law globally
both (a) because it is good for people in other societies, and (b) because
it is good for the United States' interests.
This is not an argument that judges should put international legal

norms above the legislative decisions of the democratically elected
government in which they serve; the Charming Betsy canon has no
traction when Congress's legislation is clearly inconsistent with
international legal norms. Sometimes government officials may wish
to defect from international legal norms for short-term gains; as an

interpretative canon, CharmingBetsy only insists that such defections
from international commitments should be express decisions of our
legislative representatives.

Let us consider the traditional justifications for the Charming
Betsy canon, then what the global rule of law explanation might add.
A. CongressionalIntent and Separation of Powers
Perhaps the dominant explanation for the CharmingBetsy canon

has been that it is rooted in congressional intent-that the canon
80
whether
"tracks Congress's desire to abide by international law,"
81
simply "as an assumed set of background conditions" or from a
82
This congressional
heartfelt "duty to comply with international law."
intent rationale has ample support in Supreme Court and lower court

See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018) ("Each justice or judge of the United States shall
79.
take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: 'I, __
, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as __ under the

Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God."').
2008 HARv. L. REV. Note, supra note 3, at 1218.
80.
81.
Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 583, 660 (2019) ("Traditional principles of statutory interpretation
hold that Congress legislates with international law as an assumed set of background
conditions.").
Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 3, at 493.
82.
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statements;8 3 as the D.C. Circuit recently noted, "we presume that
Congress legislates with international law in mind." 84 This does not
require Congress to know the details of the relevant international law;
one can intend to comply with a body of law without knowing its
details.

An alternative explanation for Charming Betsy is "that the case,
and the doctrine which developed from it, is animated from a concern

for separation of powers, not compliance with international law per
se."85 Under the separation-of-powersexplanation, the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government are charged with the
country's foreign relations, and a court decision putting American
domestic law in conflict with international law could touch off foreign
relation problems best left to the other branches of government. In this

separation-of-powersanalysis, the Article III component of the federal
government should not be engaged in activities by which the United
States would be "compromised or embarrassed in its foreign
relations." 86

Again, one can find case law that speaks to this separation-ofpowers/avoid-foreign-embarrassment rationale. In its 1963 McCulloch

v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras decision, the Court
was quite explicit in its belief that anything other than its ruling that

the National Labor Relations Act did not apply to a foreign-flag ship
would "arouse[] vigorous protests from foreign governments and
create[] international problems for our government." 87 In Benz v.

83.
See. e.g, Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 44 (1801) (adopting a narrow
interpretation of the statute and reasoning "[b]y this construction the act of [C]ongress
will never violate those principles which we believe, and which it is our duty to believe,
the legislature of the United States will always hold sacred"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) ("[We understand Congress' grant
of authority for the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to include the authority to
detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on
longstanding law-of-war principles."); see also FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-PontA-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) ("Congress is customarily
presumed, unless a plain intention appears to the contrary, to avoid conflict with such
principles [of international law].").
84.
United States v. Garcia Sota, 948 F.3d 356, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal
citation omitted) (noting "[t]hat presumption [was] originally set forth in Murray V.
Schooner CharmingBetsy").
85.

Roger P. Alford, ForeignRelations as a Matter of Interpretation:The Use and

Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339, 1344 (2006).
86.
Steinhardt, supra note 8 at 1130. Alford proposes a different separation of
powers explanation for CharmingBetsy: that it is a doctrine by which the judicial branch
prevents Congress from inadvertently complicating the executive branch's conduct of
international affairs. Alford, supra note 85 at 1342 ("As a doctrine of separation of
powers, the Charming Betsy canon seeks to eliminate international discord in
furtherance of an executive prerogative to comply with international obligations without
inadvertent congressional circumscription.").
87.
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 17
(1963); see In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing other instances in which
courts slip into political "goals" discourse, concluding "that the statutory language and
our country's foreign policy goals support" the lower court's decision).
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Compania Naviera Hidalgo,88 the Court also expressed concern that
extending NLRB jurisdiction to picketing at an American port of "a
foreign ship operated entirely by foreign seamen under foreign articles"
would trigger international reaction and concluded "[f]or us to run

interference in such a delicate field of international relations there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed." 89 The D.C. Circuit has also described CharmingBetsy as
"embody[ing] concerns for preserving the relationships between the
branches of government in a system of separation of powers."90
Yet each of these two explanations for the canon can lead one to
question CharmingBetsy's relevance in contemporary circumstances.

Commentators sometimes remind us that Charming Betsy comes
from a time when the fledgling American Republic was both militarily

weak and a suspect form of government-a young country in need of
peaceful relations with more established sovereigns. 9 1 In those
circumstances, sensible members of Congress would have wanted the
new country to be perceived as law-abiding by European powers (the

88.
See generally Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidlago, 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
Id. at 147 (adding that Congress "alone has the facilities necessary to make
89.
fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of international discord
are so evident and retaliative action so certain."). Describing the Benz decision almost
20 years later, Justice Rehnquist approvingly noted "the Court in that case made clear
its reluctance to intrude domestic labor law willy-nilly into the complex of considerations
affecting foreign trade, absent a clear congressional mandate to do so." Windward
Shipping (London), Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 110 (1974). Later the
Windward majority seemed to indicate that "retaliatory action," if the US did assert
jurisdiction, was unlikely. Id. at 114-15.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 494, n.13 (D.C.
90.
Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted) ("The Constitution commits to the Legislative and
Executive Branches, not to the Judicial Branch, the conduct of foreign relations. Our
rules of statutory construction in the instant case embody concerns for preserving the
relationships between the branches of government in a system of separation of powers.
Hence, we hesitate to infer from 7 U.S.C. § 15, absent clear congressional intent,
enforcement jurisdiction that arouses foreign sensibilities and implicates international
law concerns."). The canons under discussion were the CharmingBetsy doctrine and the
related Foley Bros. canon against extraterritorial application of domestic law.
See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
91.
VAND. L. REV. 819, 839 (1989) ("The primary consideration that forced the United States
to pay respect to the law of nations was the country's weakness in relation to European
powers."); see also Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 3, at 492; Harold H. Koh,
InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (2004) ("[T]he global
legitimacy of a fledgling nation crucially depended upon the compatibility of its domestic
law with the rules of the international system within which it sought acceptance."); Ryan
Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing: InternationalHuman Rights and
Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 464 (1997) ("As new members in the
community of nations, the Founders felt bound, both ethically and pragmatically, to
inherit and abide by the law of nations."). It is true that Chief Justice Marshall's decision
came just six years after the United States started its own navy-with six frigates-in
response to piracy attacks on U.S. merchant shipping while, in contrast, the British
Empire had a naval fleet in 1800 of over 700 ships. See Commissioned Ships of the Royal
Navy, GENERALIST, http://www.generalist.org.uk/docs/navy1800.html (last visited July
12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G9W3-AE3Q] (archived July 12, 2020).
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congressional intent explanation) and for courts to steer clear of
triggering
any
international
problems
(separation-of-powers
explanation). A potential implication is that the pragmatic
underpinnings for CharmingBetsy have largely dissipated: governing

a nuclear-armed global empire, so the reasoning goes, Congress may
no longer be much concerned with the niceties of international law and

decisions about whether the United States should respect or ignore
international legal norms can be more confidently left to the executive
(when that branch of government is interpreting ambiguous laws of

Congress). 92 In short,

if the canon is justified by

presumed

congressional respect for international law, why think that now?
On the separation-of-powers side, one could also reason that if the
canon was to keep the judiciary from undermining the conduct of
foreign affairs, in modern circumstances is there really much danger
in any court decision having a significant impact on the United States'
foreign affairs given its global footprint economically, militarily, and

diplomatically? 93
Another way to look at the two explanations is that a
congressional intent explanation of Charming Betsy casts Article III
courts as carrying out the Article I legislators' grand, if implicit,

intentions while the separation-of-powers explanation of Charming
Betsy is a negative justification; in other words, Article III courts
should stay out of the way of the grand designs of the other branches
of government as they ply "the devious and intricate path of
[international] politics." 94 But does CharmingBetsy really keep Article
III courts out of international affairs?
When a relevant dispute comes before a federal court, the United

States may or may not already be viewed as complying with or
violating international law. Foreign reactions to the statutory law

when passed, to the agency regulations when promulgated, or to the
particular executive branch determination (as with a customs or
immigration action) may have already caused some groups or

92.
But see Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 287 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611 (D. Md.
2003) (noting Charming Betsy "was the proper rule of construction for an honorable
young nation facing an uncertain future, and it remains the proper rule of construction
for a mature, powerful, and confident republic confronting a hostile and dangerous

world").
93.
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and ForeignAffairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649,
664 (2000) ("[I]t is not clear to what extent judicial enforcement of foreign affairs law will
actually impede the ability of the United States to act effectively in international
relations.") [hereinafter Bradley, Chevron Deference].
94.
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 421-23 (1815) (recognizing norms of
customary law as it relates to the character of cargo (neutral or belligerent) shipped in
vessels (neutral or belligerent) and, furthermore, that the US had deviated from those
norms in different bilateral treaties. The court further held that questions of retaliation
for "unjust proceedings toward our citizens" are strictly for the political branches: "It is
not for us to depart from the beaten track prescribed for us, and to tread the devious and

intricate path of politics.").

1168

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW [vOL. 53:1147

governments abroad to characterize the United States as complying
with or violating its international legal obligations. In those cases, the
court decision is likely to confirm or revise the conclusion that others
have already reached as to America honoring its international
obligations.
In other situations, the court decision might be the first time the
international implications of a domestic statute have come to the fore,
and it is the court's decision by which the United States will be viewed
95
When other
as in compliance or in violation of international law.
countries question the United States as to its compliance with

international law after significant court decisions-as happens in the
various councils of the World Trade Organization-this diplomatic

ballet again reflects the fact that court rulings are acts of state for
international law. 96 The courts simply cannot avoid their "position of
oversight" as to the "international liability for the country as a

whole." 97
So Charming Betsy will not keep the Article III courts out of
"foreign affairs"; court decisions, as acts of state, will have
international implications. 98 Instead, the canon only keeps courts, in
narrow circumstances, from the "embarrassment of declaring a statute
99
in violation of international law." One could just as well construct a
"separation of powers" argument for eliminatingthe Charming Betsy

canon altogether: that if an administration wants to execute a law in a
way that violates our international legal obligations, that should be the

Jonathan Turley has made much the same point that the courts will to some
95.
extent be making judgments that impact foreign policy regardless of how the canon
points. Turley, supra note 4, at 238.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth
96.
Amendment applies "against State action, . . . whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial"); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) (noting " a State acts
by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way"). See
also Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Arts. on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 4, (Oct. 24, 2001) (noting "the conduct of any State
organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds
in the organization of the State").
Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 1128.
97.
In a recent litigation brought by Qatar against Arab banks claiming that they
98.
were participating in the economic boycott of Qatar, the banks sought to remove the New
York state law suit to federal court on the grounds that the United States had been
neutral in the Saudi/Qatari dispute and "reaching a final judgment in this suit will
violate the United States policy of neutrality." Qatar v. First Abu Dhabi Bank, 432 F.
Supp. 3d 401, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The court rejected this as a grounds for removing the
case to federal court, noting that under the banks theory "by adjudicating this matter,
the United States will 'take a side' in this international dispute, contrary to its policy of
neutrality. . . . Under their theory, one nation or another will be displeased no matter
which way the Court rules." Id. at 419.
Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 1115.
99.
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prerogative of the Article II branch. Indeed, Eric Posner and Cass
Sunstein have made such an argument, 100 a proposal discussed below.
But saving courts from the "embarrassment of declaring a statute

in violation of international law" contains the kernel for another
explanation of the vitality of the CharmingBetsy canon. After a period
when the importance of the judiciary as a check on the executive

branch has become especially pronounced, we can better appreciate
CharmingBetsy as a canon of interpretation that supports the rule of
law.
B. Support for Both Domestic and Global Rule of Law
The rule of law justification-or bundle of justifications-for the
Charming Betsy canon says that distinct from whatever Congress
intends and distinct from the Constitution's separation of the different

branches of government, judges have (and should have) a normative
commitment to advancing what is commonly called "the rule of law"

and that judicial decisions that align domestic American law with the
international legal obligations of the United States are both
expressions of and endorsements of the rule of law.
Few would quibble with Justice Sotomayor when she said she
"believe[s] in the rule of law as the foundation for all our basic
rights," 101 but the notion of "rule of law" is "elusive," 102 if not

"contested." 0 3 Different people mean different things-of varying
complexity and rigor-when they say "rule of law."1 04 This is not the
place to summarize the vast "rule of law" literature, but given how
frequently lawyers and law professors use this concept,1 05 it may be

100.

See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 61.

101.

Judges Explain Rule of Law, Why It Matters, U.S. COURTS (Aug. 8, 2019),

https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2019/08/08/judges-explain-rule-law-why-it-matters

[https://perma.cc/YP6U-Y52F] (archived July 12, 2020) [hereinafter Judges ExplainRule
of Law].
102. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, SING. J.
LEGAL STUD. 232, 232 (2012) ("[T]his universally popular notion is elusive.").
103. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested
Concept (in Florida)?,21 LAW & PHIL. 137 (2002).
104. BRANDEIS
INSTITUTE
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
JUDGES,
TOWARD
AN
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 8 (2010) ("[T]he semantic content of the term 'rule of law'

is not constant but instead depends on who uses it and to what purpose.") [hereinafter
2010 BRANDEIS REPORT].
105.

See FRANK J. GARCIA, CONSENT & TRADE: TRADING FREELY IN A GLOBAL

MARKET 98 (2019) (discussing "rule of law gains" from a WTO agreement). The idea that
we all use the phrase accepting that we are all saying the same thing comes, in part,
from its early 21st century currency in international institutions. See Thomas Carothers,
The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF

KNOWLEDGE 3 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) (describing "rule of law" in international
aid programs at the turn of the millennium as "suddenly everywhere-a venerable part
of Western political philosophy enjoying a new run as a rising imperative of the era of
globalization").
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helpful to specify how the phrase is used here and where this use falls
in rule of law thinking.

The notion of "rule of law" can be traced back to Aristotle, and the
phrase itself appeared in the 1610 English Petition of Grievances,
arguing that English subjects enjoy the right "to be guided and

governed by the certain rule of law." 106 There are scores of modern
10 7
but this Article will focus on a
formulations of the "rule of law,"
108
One of the most minimal formulations would be
"thin" version.
Brian Tamanaha's "[t]he rule of law means that government officials
and abide by the law,"109 which is not too

and citizens are bound by

different from federal judge Jill Otake's defining "rule of law" as
"[e]veryone understands what the law is and that everyone will be held
to that law." 110 Some additional commitments are typically considered

part of the basic idea of "rule of law":
[a]
[b]

that laws should be stable, public, consistent, and known in
advance;
that these laws are applied nonarbitrarily 11 and equally to
all citizens, without regard to their individual circumstances;

[c]

that these laws are applied equally to government and its
actions; 11 2 and

[d]

that the application of law is done through adjudication by an
independent judiciary.

In addition to these components (in one form or another), some add

106.

Petition of temporalgrievances, in PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1610: HOUSE

OF COMMONS 257, 257-58 (Elizabeth Read Foster ed., 1966) (In a petition to the King on
secular ("temporal") matters, Parliament wrote "[a]mongst many other points of
happiness and freedom which your Majesty's subjects of this kingdom have enjoyed
under your royal progenitors, Kings and queens of this realm, there is none which have
accounted more dear and precious than this, to be guided and governed by the certain
rule of law, which giveth both to the head and the members that which of right belongeth
to them and not by any uncertain or arbitrary form of government.").
107.

See A.V. DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE

CONSTITUTION 171 (MacMillan, 1st ed. 1885) (analyzing the original "rule of law"
concept).
108. See Simon Chesterman, An InternationalRule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
331, 340-41 (2008) (discussing "thin" and "thick" conceptions of "rule of law").
109. Tamanaha, supra note 102, at 233.
110. Judges Explain Rule of Law, supra note 101.
111. See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory, 2
RATIO JURIS. 79, 82-83 (1989) (noting that arbitrariness is corrosive to the rule of law).
112. See Civics (History and Government) Questions for the Naturalization Test,
U.S.

CITIZENSHIP

&

IMMIGR.

SERVS.,

(Jan.

2019),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%200f%2OCitizenship/Citizenship
[https://perma.cc/V4PJ-R8QV]
%20Resource%2OCenter%2OSite/Publications/100q.pdf
(archived July 12, 2020) (setting out the test for U.S. citizenship regarding a question
and answer exchange as related to the rule of law: "What is the 'rule of law'? Everyone
must follow the law. Leaders must obey the law. Government must obey the law. No one
is above the law.").
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respect for human rights or that the domestic laws must be consistent
with international human rights norms. 113 But this additional
component moves beyond the "thin" understanding of rule of law.
Understood this way, promoting domestic rule of law in developing

countries has been a centerpiece of international development
programs for decades. It is an agenda that can attract support from
both financial investors and human rights activists.

Separate from this concern for what happens in each jurisdiction,
there has been much discussion and debate over "international rule of
law" to govern the interactionof sovereign nations. This "international

rule of law" is frequently conceptualized at the level of state-to-state,
government-to-government interaction, i.e., how states resolve border
or resource disputes between themselves, how states and international

organizations abide by the laws of war and occupation, etc. At this
level, much has been written about whether, when, and how
"international rule of law" shapes the interaction of sovereign states 114
as well as constrains international organizations. 1 5 There is a rich
debate on how much international rule of law is truly separate from

113. The federal judiciary's own website describes "[r]ule of law [as] a principle
under which all persons, institutions, and entities are accountable to laws that are:
[p]ublicly promulgated; [e]qually enforced; [i]ndependently adjudicated; [a]nd consistent
with international human rights principles." See Overview - Rules of Law, U.S. COURTs,
https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/overview-rule-

law (last visited July 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J4MJ-V8HA] (archived July 12, 2020);
see also 2010 BRANDEIS REPORT, supra note 104 ("general consensus" that the "essential
elements" of the rule of law are "equality before the law, strict observance of due process,
and judicial independence" but adding that "[t]he law to which everyone submits" is "one
that protects human rights"). The United Nations gives the following description:
[T]he rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons,
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards. It requires measures to ensure adherence

to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before the law,
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.
What is the Rule of Law, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-

rule-of-law/ (last visited July 12, 2020) [https://perma.ccW9XD-Z6GW] (archived July

12, 2020).
114.

See generally Chesterman, supra note

108; Dennis Jacobs, What is an

International Rule of Law?, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3 (2006); Ian Hurd, The
InternationalRule of Law: Law and the Limits of Politics, 28 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 39
(2014); William W. Bishop, The InternationalRule of Law, 59 MICH L. REV. 553 (1961).
115.

See

ORGANIZATIONS

generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ,
ON INTERNATIONAL LAw (2017).

THE

IMPACT

OF

INTERNATIONAL
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international politics 1 16 or whether
117
internationalversion of rule of law."

there

is

a

"distinctively

But there is also the "rule of law" concern that each nation
implement domestically its international legal obligations-in other
words, that nations fulfill their international legal obligations to each
other through the substance of their own domestic laws. In a world
thick with international legal norms created by multilateral,

plurilateral, and bilateral agreements, pacta sunt servanda happens
less with state-to-state interaction on the international plane and more
with domestic implementation of international obligations (in
immigration law, trade law, civil rights, criminal law, contract law,
environmental regulations). Eliciting commitments from a nation in

any of these areas is pointless unless there is "rule of law" consistency
between the international legal obligation and the nation's domestic
law. Instead of "international rule of law" one can think of this as
118
concern for the rule of law globally- or "global rule of law."

So, how does the Charming Betsy canon as used by American

courts fit into these considerations? The canon is clearly "a tool for the
judiciary to advance the normatively desirable goal of harmonizing

domestic law with international law," 119 but we need to say more. In
terms of domestic rule of law, to the degree that treaty commitments
of the United States are part of the "supreme Law of the Land" and
customary international legal norms are part of federal common law,
Charming Betsy is a doctrine harmonizing different elements of our

domestic legal regime-and thereby avoiding arbitrariness that
corrodes rule of law.12 0 By shaping domestic law to meet international
obligations, CharmingBetsy makes the state itself accountable to laws
12
it publicly accepted as binding; ' the canon applies "law" to the

116. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, Dag Hammerskjold and the Relation of Law to
Politics, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1962); Hurd, supra note 114, at 48 ("To deploy
international law in defense of one's policy is continuous with political strategy of the
state-it is not a step outside of politics.").
117. Hurd, supra note 114, at 47.
118. This is very different than some other commentators' use of "global rule of
law." See Chesterman, supra note 108, at 355-56 (suggesting "global rule of law" "might
denote the emergence of a normative regime that touches individuals directly without
formal mediation through existing national institutions").
119. 2008 HARv. L. REV. Note, supranote 3, at 1218.
120. See 2010 BRANDEIS REPORT, supra note 104, at 9 (one participant describing
an overall absence of the rule of law" as when "the laws were not applied, or they were
applied arbitrarily").
121. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) ("[A]
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private,
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards.").
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sovereign-one of the basic elements of rule of law. 122 As Rachel
Kleinfeld observes, "[r]eining in the state by forcing it to govern
through a known set of laws has been accepted as a goal of rule of law
since the ancient Greeks."1 23 In its narrow realm of application,
Charming Betsy forces the state to govern consistent with public
commitments the state has undertaken vis-a-vis other states and
known laws in the law of nations.
In short, CharmingBetsy advances both our own "domestic rule of
law" narrowly understood and "global rule of law" in terms of the
United States honoring pacta sunt servanda.
At the level of "international law," the Charming Betsy doctrine

will not have significant impact on the "rule of law" understood as
state-to-state interaction, but the canon engages American judges with
international legal norms (versus, say, an interpretative canon that
said international legal norms were irrelevant to interpretation of

domestic statutes). And to the degree Charming Betsy compels
American judges to recognize and interpret international legal norms,
it has the salutary effect of bringing a cohort of relatively well-trained,
disciplined jurists into the business of helping shape international law.

Even if that is not "rule of law" per se, it is surely a salutary effect of
the canon. Separate from the effect on domestic law, all or almost all
American policymakers would choose more American influence over
substantive interpretation of international legal norms versus less.
Turning to domestic rule of law in other countries-and those
countries implementing in their domestic laws the treaty obligations

they have undertaken, pacta sunt servanda, it should be clear that the
CharmingBetsy doctrine provides an example for other countries. Each
American court decision interpreting an ambiguous statute to fulfill
our treaty obligations sends a signal to judges in other jurisdictions to

do the same. One can debate how strong a signal and how much
American courts can lead by example, but there is no question that the

122. Tamanaha, supra note 102, at 236 ("The broadest understanding of the rule
of law, a thread that has run for over two thousand years, is that the sovereign, the state
and its officials, are limited by the law. . . . Restraining the sovereign's awesome power
has been a perennial struggle for societies as long as they have existed.").
123. Rachel Kleinfield, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING
THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD - IN SEARcH OF KNOWLEDGE 31, 35 (Thomas Carothers ed.,
2006).
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12 4
regulations, 12 5 and
American legal system-judicial decisions,
12 6
-provides an important role model for other countries.
statutes
Strengthening this global rule of law serves both the United

States' ideals and its pragmatic needs. Idealistically, in the post-1945
world the thicket of international legal norms has grown more vast and

dense-and that thicket of norms has been largely shaped by the
United States. 12 7 The great international project of the United
States-the Pax Americana-has not just been relative peace, but the
spread of democratic institutions and human rights as well as the
increasing economic prosperity of the world based on increasingly
transparent, predictable market conditions. It may be diplomatically
awkward to discuss, but it is simply hard to overstate how much the
post-1945 international human rights, trade, and finance regimes have

124. See, e.g., LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER, THE
IMPACT OF FOREIGN LAW ON DOMESTIC JUDGEMENTS (2010) (surveying 12 jursidictions

and describing influence of American case law, including in Argentina, Canada, China,
and India); JUDICIAL COSMOPOLITANISM: THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS (Giuseppe Ferrari ed., 2019) (offering a variety of essays on

the use of foreign law in European, American, and East Asian courts); see also Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) Writ Petition No. 167 of 2012 (India)
2020)
12,
July
visited
(last
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110813550/
[https://perma.cc/R7BP-AAFT] (archived July 12, 2020) (quoting four U.S. Supreme
Court decisions on freedom of expression); see generally Peter Herzog, United States
Supreme Court Cases in the Court of Justice of the EuropeanCommunities, 21 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. 903 (1998); Philip M. Moremen, National Court Decisions as State
Practice: A Transnational Judicial Dialogue, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 259
(2006); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191
(2003); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
JudicialDialoguein Creatingand EnforcingInternationalLaw, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005).
125. See, e.g., Max Bearak, India's Environment Ministry Appears to Have
Thoroughly Plagiarized a U.S. Document, WASH. POST (July 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/08/indias-environmentministry-appears-to-have-thoroughly-plagiarized-a-u-s-document/
[https://perma.cc/33YC-HERK] (archived July 12, 2020) (finding that, of the Indian
Government's new Environmental Supplement Plan, "a full 2,900 words of the 3,850 in
the Indian plan were lifted word for word" from the counterpart U.S. document).
126. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics - at Home and Abroad, in
COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth Okediji ed., 2016)

(describing how U.S. fair use - 17 U.S.C. § 107 - was copied into other national copyright
laws).
127.

See, e.g., LEIF WENAR, BLOOD OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE, AND THE RULES THAT

RUN THE WORLD 171 (2015) ("[T]he United States, of all nations, has been the lead
architect of the international system since 1945."); Max Boot & Ben Steil, Selling
America Short, WKLY. STANDARD (Feb. 26, 2016), www.weeklystandard.com/selling-

america-short/article/2001271 [https://perma.cc/9AR2-S78M] (archived July 12, 2020)
(observing that "[o]ne of America's greatest accomplishments in the early postwar era
was the creation of a rules-based international trade regime"); Joseph R. Biden, Why
at
available
2020),
(March/April
AFF.
Lead, FOREIGN
America Must
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-mustlead-again [https://perma.cc/DG2X-K6W9] (archived Sept. 20, 2020) (lamenting that "the
international system that the United States so carefully constructed is coming apart at
the seams.").

20201

1175

THE CHARMING BETSY CANON

been built along American outlines. 1 28 The rule of law's strengthening

in as many jurisdictions as possible undergirds these projects.
On the practical side, nothing is more important for the efficient,

affordable maintenance of America's far-flung geopolitical and
commercial interests than rule of law in as many of those jurisdictions
as possible. In 2007, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein argued that
Charming Betsy should give way to Chevron-style deference to
executive interpretations of statutes that concern foreign affairs1 2 9
an argument that we will explore in Part V. While recognizing that

CharmingBetsy produces the benefit of "a general strengthening of the
system of international law,"1 30 they reasoned that this should only
trigger "an additional judgment about whether deference has systemic
or rule of law benefits or disadvantages for the United States."1 31 In

the context of that calculus, Posner and Sunstein offered the stunning
comment (then and now) that "[t]he United States generally has little
interest in what occurs on foreign soil."1 32 From that, they reasoned
that calculated violations of international law will often enough accrue
to the short-term benefit of the United States without long-term
detriment that such decision should be left to the executive branch.1 3 3

The claim that "[t]he United States generally has little interest in
what occurs on foreign soil" was and is fake news from law

128. See, e.g., Luisa Blanchfield & Cynthia Brown, The United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:Issues in the U.S. Ratification Debate, CONG.
RES.
SERV.,
(Jan.
21,
2015)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mise/R42749.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E27D-LNCQ] (archived Aug. 20, 2020) ("[S]ome CRDP provisions
appear to be modelled after U.S. disabilities laws."); Cleveland, supra note 8, at 102
(determining the United States as "the primary instigator behind the establishment of
the UN system and the creation of modern international treaties ranging from human
rights and humanitarian law to international intellectual property and international
trade" (footnotes omitted)); NATALIE KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE

SENATE 93 (1990) (discussing U.S. influence over the drafting of the Human Rights
Covenants and concluding that U.S. "proposals were for the most part accepted, and on
the rare occasions when they were not, compromises protective of the U.S. system were
reached"); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom,
Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 94 (1992) (noting in
international human rights "a remarkable correlation between the norms identified as

customary rules, and the range of rights which has been incorporated into the U.S. Bill
of Rights").
129. See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 61.
130. Id. at 1186 (conditionally recognizing the Charming Betsy doctrine: "[i]f
respect for international
commitments").
131. Id.

law

promotes

cooperation

and

preserves

long-term

132. Id. at 1188.
133. They focus on whether "a certain kind of litigation will offend a foreign
sovereign, whether the sovereign is likely to respond by reducing cooperation, or whether
such cooperation is valuable." Id. at 1205. For that reason, they "have trouble seeing a
normative justification for many applications of the doctrines when the other state does
not reciprocate and when the risk of retaliation is trivial." Id. at 1192.
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The reality of the early twenty-first century is that 3 to

6 million American citizens live abroad and-as noted by Justice
135
Breyer- on average, 23 million Americans travel abroad each year.
The reality is that the United States has over $4 trillion in
accumulated investment on foreign soil (making it, as of 2012, the
world's largest investor in other jurisdictions).13 6 In short, the safety of
a vast amount of American blood and treasure depends on "what occurs
on foreign soil." Those lives and wealth are more secure when these
other jurisdictions adhere to mutually-agreed international legal
norms, whether on maritime navigation or civil litigation, freedom of
religion or protection of trademarks.
As to customary international legal norms protecting individuals,

a reason for us to respect those norms domestically is that "our State
Department has often successfully insisted foreign nations must
recognize [those norms] as to our nationals abroad. 137 On the treaty
side, we have spent enormous diplomatic efforts for two centuries
pursuing series after "series of treaties" seeking "in general to put the
citizens of the United States and citizens of other treaty countries on a
38
par with regard to trading, commerce and property rights."1 What we

secure in those treaties is worthless unless rule of law in other
jurisdictions implements each country's international obligations in its

domestic legal order. Indeed, even if no American ever set foot abroad,
for transborder problems-from carbon emissions to human migration

to protection of endangered species-domestic enforcement in other
jurisdictions of agreed internationalrules is very much in our practical,

local interests.
At the end of the day, a global rule of law explanation of Charming
Betsy can either be the normative undertaking of a single judge or

reflect the normative undertaking of the United States to produce a
more law-abiding global community; either way, the use of the
Charming Betsy canon in American jurisprudence sends a message of

134. Jinks and Katyal ably responded to this myopia in relation to US military
deployments and correctly emphasized our own interests in everyone strictly abiding by
the law of war, including treatment of prisoners and humanitarian law. See generally
Jinks & Katyal, supranote 7.
135. BREYER, supra note 9, at 102.
136. JAMES J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21118, U.S.
INVESTMENT
ABROAD:
TRENDS
AND
CURRENT
ISSUES
2-3,

DIRECT
(2013),

2020)
28,
July
visited
(last
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21118.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VC4-5CJQ] (archived July 28, 2020) ("[T]he overseas direct
investment position of U.S. firms on a historical-cost basis, or the cumulative amount at
book value, reached $4.4 trillion in 2012, the latest year for such investment position
data.").
137. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65 (1941) ("[A]part from treaty obligations,
there has grown up in the field of international relations a body of customs defining with
more or less certainty the duties owing by all nations to alien residents-duties which
our State Department has often successfully insisted foreign nations must recognize as
to our nationals abroad.").
138. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 195 (1961).
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commitment to rule of law. That should be congressional intent, but
even if it were not, it should be our national intent as the globe's
"leading proponent of international human rights law," 139 leading
proponent of rules-based free markets, leading proponent of
democratic institutions, etc.
Understanding the Charming Betsy canon as a manifestation of
global rule of law, the discussion below considers different problems for
the canon in contemporary circumstances.

IV. CHARMING BETSY IN A GLOBALIZED, PAX AMERICANA WORLD

As international legal norms increasingly address "substantive
matters of our political and economic life traditionally reserved to
exclusive domestic jurisdiction," 140 the theoretical fiat of Charming
Betsy grows and a canon of interpretation once only rarely dusted off
and used could become a more common instrument in judicial decisionmaking. 141 Those concerned with preserving national sovereignty may
find this alarming, even to the point of proposing the canon's

elimination. But if one believes that CharmingBetsy is justified in part
by the promotion of rule of law globally-andthat strengthened rule of
law within other jurisdictions and among jurisdictions is a normatively

desirable part of the American-sponsored, post-1945 order, then
CharmingBetsy is as relevant as it has ever been.
Once the canon is understood as advancing the rule of law in a
globalized world, it is reasonable to conclude (a) that courts should be
more comfortable in finding clear international legal norms in express
treaty commitments than in customary international law, but (b) that
American courts should not demur from contributing to the
clarification of international legal norms through interpretations of

treaty provisions and analyses that can either crystallize or debunk
alleged customary international law.
On the first point, greater skepticism toward customary
international law comports with concerns over inadvertent loss of
sovereignty, while emphasis on treaty commitments is emphasis on
(more) transparently negotiated legal norms resulting from
multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral discussions in which
democratically elected governments, particularly ours, have almost

139. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
140. Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 1111. See also Ahmed, supra note 8 (quoting
lawyer Robert Volterra, "[t]here are treaties regulating almost every human activity,
including child custody, the content of breakfast cereals, and what compensation
travellers receive if an airline loses luggage").
141. Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 93, at 685 ("Indeed, lower court
application of the [CharmingBetsy] canon appears to be on the rise, perhaps because the
number of potential conflicts between federal statutory law and international law has
been growing.").
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always had a dominant voice. The reason for the second point should
and
American courts discussing, analyzing,
be self-evident:
interpreting international legal norms, whether customary or treatybased, provide a valuable "input" into the formation of international

law-valuable because of the experience of our judges, the quality of
our litigation, and the insights of the American perspective.

A. Rigorous Identification of Customary InternationalLaw
The first element in a proper application of Charming Betsy is an
unambiguous international legal norm. This seems obvious, but as

Ralph Steinhardt has noted, "[e]ven a court committed to giving
international law its due under Charming Betsy may encounter
considerable difficulty determining what 'international law' requires in

these circumstances."

4 2

And there is probably considerable consensus

that the difficulty is greater with customary international law (CIL)
14 3
than with treaty provisions.

Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have identified three
fundamental changes inpotential CIL since 1945 that cause discomfort
for jurists, courts, and policymakers: that "new" CIL has the "the
individual, and not just the state" as its subject;1 44 that "it is less tied
14 6
to state practice"; 145 and that it "can develop very rapidly."
Of course, the last of these cannot itself disprove CIL: American
judges have always recognized that customary international law can

142. Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 1164.
143. See Bishop, supra note 114, at 567 (describing the displacement of CIL with
express treaty provisions as a "gain in clarity of international rules and their suitability
to human needs [that] may come at the expense of that habitual conformity to law and
tradition which characterizes all customary law").
144. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 839. And that means it attempts to
address "many matters that were traditionally regulating by domestic law alone." Id. at
840-41.
145. Id. at 839.
146. Id. at 840. For opposition to CIL being developed in all these ways, see
generally Simma & Alston, supranote 128 (questioning whether efforts to "up-date" CIL
do "fundamental ... violence to the very concept"); J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy
and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in InternationalLaw, 1979 U.
ILL. L.F. 609 (1979) (questioning foundations of "new" international law).
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change,1 4 7 sometimes rapidly. In the 1871 decision, Scotia,14 8 the
Supreme Court concluded that a new customary international legal
norm had come into being only a few years previously. The Court held
that an American ship that had displayed the wrong lights as
prescribed by American law1 49 was negligent in a nighttime collision
with a British ship "independently of the act of Congress" because the
US ship had violated a new customary legal norm.1 50
The new norm had arisen because "before the close of the year
1864, nearly all the commercial nations of the world had adopted the
same regulations respecting lights"151 and those rules once "accepted
as obligatory rules by more than thirty of the principle commercial
states of the world" had become part of "the laws of the sea."1 52 The
Scotia Court gave various formulations for how this change from the
"ancient maritime law" had occurred: a new norm emerges "because it

has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct"; 15 3 the new norm
"become[s] the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction of those
nations who may be said to constitute the commercial world"154 and
the change in norms is "accomplished .

.

. by the concurrent assent,

express or understood, of maritime nations." 155
When a claimed CIL norm is of recent vintage, courts should

demand-as in Scotia-clearprovenance and consistent practice from
a substantial body of important jurisdictions; as the Court more

recently said in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain the new norm must be
"accepted by the civilized world" and defined with the kind of specificity
that characterized eighteenth century violations of the law of nations

147. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 122 (1814) (relying on
"mitigations" of the customary laws on wartime seizures); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 694 (1900) (determining that a principle which had once just been a matter of comity
had ripened into a "settled rule of international law"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 588 n.14 (1951) (citing the 1920 and 1948 editions of Oppenheim's treatise on
international law showing a shift in state obligations vis-a-vis expulsion of aliens);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing Paquete Habanaas
standing for proposition that "courts must interpret international law not as it was in
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."); Maria v.
McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Customary international law is not
static but fluid and evolving."); Cleveland, supra note 8, at 93 ("The Court consistently
applies international law as an evolving body of doctrine.").
148. See generally Scotia, 81 U.S. 170 (1871).
149. Id. at 183 ("The Berkshire was an American ship, belonging to the mercantile
marine, and she was required by the act of Congress of April 29th, 1864, to carry green
and red lights, which she did not carry, and she was forbidden to carry the white light,
which she did carry. By exhibiting a white light, she, therefore, held herself forth as a
steamer, and by exhibiting it from her deck, instead of from her masthead, she
misrepresented her distance from approaching vessels.").
150. Id. at 184.
151. Id. at 186.
152. Id. at 188.
153. Id. at 187.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 188.
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like piracy. As Ernest Young noted, "domestic courts should be
extremely careful in 'finding' customary norms. They should insist, for
example, on real and pervasive evidence of state practice and opinio
juris."15 6 In short, determinations of customary international law
should be inductive: if the alleged norms are not being practiced, they
may be laudatory standards for humanity, but not "settled rule[s] of
international law." 15 7 As the Second Circuit panel said in the 1980

Filartigav. Pena-Iralacase, "the requirement that a rule command the
'general assent of civilized nations' is a stringent one."15 8
While this may not be the most encouraging position for people
who want to use North American and European legal systems to
hasten the formation of progressive CIL norms, this posture has one
important side effect: having tough standards for establishing CIL is
consistent with a preference that the global rule of law be built on legal
norms more openly negotiated, debated, and settled upon by express
consensus-that is, through multilateral treaties.
This is also not to say that American judges should be skeptical
about taking up the question of the claimed customary international
legal norm; by the lights of the rule of law explanation of Charming
Betsy, American courts should embrace such questions, but be rigorous
in identifying both that there is a relevant customary international

legal norm and as to the content of that norm. As William Bishop noted
in 1961, "[d]ecisions of the courts help to form custom, and they show
us what courts have accepted as international law."15 9 American
judges should not shrink from their participation in this global process.
B. Identifying the Clear Content of a Treaty Obligation
In terms of identifying clear legal norms, it is reasonable to think
that the ex ante precision of treaty obligations will generally exceed
that of CIL norms. Many treaty provisions are, at their initiation,

crystal clear or at least crystal clear in a substantial area of activity.
Examples of this sort would be the protection accorded to civilian
hospitals in wartime by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
1 60
the twenty-year term
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;

of protection required for patents under the 1994 TRIPS Agreement;161

156. Young, supra note 8, at 390.
157. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
158. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
159. Bishop, supra note 114, at 557.
160. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 18, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ("Civilian hospitals
organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in
no circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all times be respected and protected
by the Parties to the conflict.").
161. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15,

20201

THE CHARMING BETSY CANON

1181

the prohibition on export quotas in the 1947 General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT); or the total limit on "incidental dolphin
mortality" in the Agreement on the International Dolphin
Conservation Program. 6 2
Of course, there are also treaty provisions that are vague when
drafted, often intentionally so.1 63 Such provisions may or may not be
clarified over time by consistent state practice. And treaty provisions
which seem to create focused obligations when read in isolation may be
more ambiguous in context or may become more general through
divergent state practice.1 64 In short, treaty provisions themselves may

require interpretative exercises to establish the substantive content of
the international obligation. 165
This is where the different justifications for CharmingBetsy may
give a person different intuitions on a court's best strategy. A court
motivated to avoid foreign entanglements by its respect for the
separation of powers might be tempted to find that a statute is
unambiguous, making the international law inquiry irrelevant.

Whereas the global rule of law perspective may point in a different
direction: the system of international legal norms will generally be
improved by the participation of jurists from sophisticated judicial
systems. The more jurists from strong legal traditions provide
thoughtful interpretations of international legal norms, the stronger
and more robust the entire international legal system will be.

For example, the issue before the Federal Circuit in the 2005 In re
Rath case was whether the United States was required under the Paris

1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 ("The term of protection available shall not end
before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.").
162. Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program art. 5, May
15, 1998, L132, 27/05/1999.
163. One example is the definition of a "child" in the The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. See LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RES. SERv., THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 13 (2013)

https://fas.org/sgp/ers/misc/R40484.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7SN-5S7M] (archived Aug.
19, 2020) ("During negotiations on the treaty text, the issue of . . where life begins was
debated among U.N. member states. Ultimately, in the interest of compromise and to

allow for the maximum number of ratifications, CRC drafters agreed to not address the
issue in the main articles of the Convention. The intent was to leave the text purposefully
vague so that ratifying countries could interpret the provisions to align with their own
domestic law."). Another example would be what counts as a "conflict not of an

international character" for purposes of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See
generally Debra Pearlstein, How Everything Became War, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (2017).
164. As I have argued is that case with Article 6b of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. See generally Justin Hughes, American Moral
Rights and Fixing the DastarGap, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 659 (2007).
165. See e.g., Washington v. Washington State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 662 (1979) (interpreting "the character of [a] treaty right to take
fish" in a treaty between Indian tribes and the United States); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (interpreting Warsaw Convention's limitation on liability for air
carriers to extend to suits against employees of air carriers despite ambiguous treaty

language).
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Convention on Industrial Property to provide US registration to a

1 66
The USPTO
particular trademark already registered abroad.

trademark examiner had concluded that the foreign trademark was a
surname, providing an initial bar to registration under US domestic

law. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Charming Betsy was
inapplicable because the statutory provision at issue was unambiguous
(as it is). 167 On that basis, the court avoided determining the actual
168
content of the international obligation.

But the court might just as well have held-or held in the
alternative-that the international obligation itself was sufficiently
general that our domestic law met the obligation. The treaty provision

at issue requires that "[e]very trademark duly registered in the country
16 9
in the United
of origin shall be accepted for filing and protected"
States and then provides some conditions ("reservations") for refusing
registration, including when the foreign trademark is "devoid of any

distinctive character." 17 0 Under American trademark law, when a
trade name is a surname, it is presumed devoid of distinctive character
until there is a showing that the trade name has acquired "secondary
meaning." Thus, the court could as easily have found that the statutory
surname bar falls within the "devoid of any distinctive character"
1 71
In the case of this particular
reservation in the Paris Convention.
treaty provision, a thoughtful interpretation by the Federal Circuit in
2005 might have been helpful to the Singapore Supreme Court when

they dealt with the same provision a few years later. 17 2

166. See In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
167. Id. at 1211 ("However, even assuming that the surname provision of the
Lanham Act is inconsistent with the Paris Convention, section 44(e) is not susceptible to
a construction that the surname rule is overcome where there has been an earlier foreign

registration, and the Charming Betsy presumption is inapplicable.").
168. Id. at 1214 ("Whether the surname rule conflicts with the requirements of the
Paris Convention as applied to foreign registrants is a matter we need not decide.").
169. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Propery, July 14, 1967, art.
6quinqu (A)(1), 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
170. Id. art. 6qunqi(B).
171. Indeed, the US Government presented interpretation of the Paris Convention
as one way for the court to proceed. The argument that the U.S. domestic surname bar
fulfills U.S. implementation of the "devoid of distinctiveness" reservation could be
supported by Article 6(1) of the Paris Convention which provides that "[t]he conditions
for the filing and registration of trademarks shall be determined in each country of the
Union by its domestic legislation." This can be taken to provide further support for
domestic flexibility in implementing the treaty's norms. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1209
("The PTO urges that surname marks are descriptive, and therefore "devoid of any
distinctive character" within the meaning of the Paris Convention, such that no conflict
exists between the requirements of the Lanham Act and the Paris Convention.").
172. See generally Wee Loon Ng-Loy, Trade Marks, Language and Culture: The
Concept of Distinctiveness and Publici Juris, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 508 (2009).

20201

THE CHARMING BETSYCANON

1183

V. CHARMING BETSY AND THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE

Of course, the CharmingBetsy canon is one of many interpretative
tools employed by courts. CharmingBetsy does not have an opposing,

"anti-canon" as semantic interpretive doctrines do, 173 but it can often
find itself paired with administrative law's Chevron doctrine by which
courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutory law. As Judge Jane Restani and Professor Ira Bloom put it:
The difficult issues arise when the courts are faced with divining the meaning of
domestic international trade statutes not just with the guidance of . . . the
agencies administering these laws, but also with the guidance of the
174
international agreements giving rise to those laws.

Simply put, "The relationship between the CharmingBetsy canon and

Chevron deference is uncertain." 175
When the agency advocates a statutory construction expressly
compatible with the relevant international law, Charming Betsy and
Chevron simply reinforce each other. 176 But what should a court do
when an ambiguous statute has been applied by an agency in a way
that seems in conflict with the international obligations of the United

States? In these rare circumstances, should the court apply Charming
Betsy to interpret the statute so as to comply with international law

and undo the agency action? Or should a court accept the agency's
expertise per Chevron, upholding (and thereby causing) what the court
believes will be the United States' violation of an international
obligation?
Generally, lower courts have been unwilling to conclude that
Chevron automatically trumps the CharmingBetsy canon, 177 and the

173. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or CanonsAbout How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950)
(describing how each canon on interpretation of the grammar and syntax of legislation
usually as a "mirror" or opposing canon).
174. Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, InterpretingInternationalTrade Statutes: Is the

Charming Betsy Sinking?, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1533, 1541 (2001).
175. Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 93, at 685.
176. Id. Wuerth also notes that the two doctrines can work "in tandem." Wuerth,
supra note 76, at 344; see, e.g., George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623-24
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (using the Charming Betsy canon and a WTO decision to conclude that
the agency's interpretation of the statute was reasonable under Chevron); Fed. Mogul

Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing the Court of
International Trade and deferring to the Department of Commerce's interpretation of
the statute in part because it was consistent with the international obligations of the
United States).
177. Cases truly go both ways. See, e.g., Usinor v. United States, 26 C.I.T. 767, 776
(2002) ("[A]lthough Chevron states that a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute by an agency should ordinarily be afforded deference, where international
obligations arise, the reasonability of the agency's interpretation must be gauged against
such obligations."); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (holding, based in part on the Charming Betsy canon and a decision of the
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Supreme Court has muddled the discussion by citing CharmingBetsy
as a source of the constitutional avoidance doctrine and saying that
doctrine trumps Chevron (making it easy for people to think that the
8
Court has already held that CharmingBetsy trumps Chevron).17 On

the other hand, some commentators believe that Chevron should have
a kind of priority over CharmingBetsy.
A. Chevron Doctrine

In its 1984 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
decision, 17 9 the Court established the now "canonical" 180 framework for
deference to agency interpretations, regulations, and rulings:
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter: for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress . .. if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
181
permissible construction of the statute.

This led to an initial formulation of Chevron as a two-part test: (1)
a court must determine "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue" 182 and, after the statute is determined to

be ambiguous, (2) whether the agency's interpretation is "a permissible
construction of the statute" 183 because "the agency [has] leeway to

WTO, that the language of the statute spoke directly to the issue in question and that
the agency's interpretation was due no deference under Chevron); Timken Co. v. United
States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (deferring to the Commerce
Department's interpretation of the statute, and refusing to apply the Charming Betsy
canon in part because the WTO ruling in question was distinguishable); Hyundai Elec.
Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343-45 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (reasoning that
"unless the conflict between an international obligation and Commerce's interpretation
of a statute is abundantly clear, a court should take special care before it upsets
Commerce's regulatory authority under the CharmingBetsy doctrine"); Caterpillar, Inc.
v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (applying the Charming
Betsy canon to construe the 1930 Tariff Act contrary to the "proffered construction" of
U.S. Customs).
178. In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), the Court concluded that Chevron analysis yields to the
constitutional avoidance doctrine, citing Charming Betsy for this "trumping"
interpretative canon. Id. at 575. The DeBartolo citation was based on an earlier mistaken
attribution of the constitutional avoidance doctrine to the CharmingBetsy case in NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). The mix-up as to what
interpretative canons the Charming Betsy case presents has since been repeated in a
number of opinions from the Court. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 93, at
686 n.154.
179. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
180. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (establishing the "now
canonical formulation").
181. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
182. Id. at 843.
183. Id.
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enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, and purpose
of the statute." 184

Belief that Congress intended to delegate interpretation and
further specification of the law is the formal basis for Chevron
deference; in Chief Justice Roberts' succinct statement, "[c]ourts defer
to an agency's interpretation of law when and because Congress has
conferred on the agency interpretive authority over the question at
issue." 185 Thus, Chevron applies when the intent to delegate is
express 186 or when that intent can be implied.

This has led to the development of another "step" in Chevron
jurisprudence, sometimes called "Step Zero," that is an "initial inquiry
into whether the Chevron framework applies at all"1 87 or "whether and
to what extent the agency's interpretation is entitled to deference."1 88
The agency interpretation being entitled to deference depends on
Congress having delegated authority, agency expertise, and procedural
aspects of the agency's action.
That "the particular statute is within the agency's jurisdiction to

administer"1 89 seems to be a necessary condition for implied delegation
of authority under Chevron, but may not be a sufficient condition. In
United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court noted that implied

184. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
185. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 312 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See id. at 296 ("Chevronis rooted in a background presumption of congressional intent.");
Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2019) (quoting King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473,
485 (2015)) (Chevron deference "is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory
gaps"); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("Deference
under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it administers is premised
on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress
to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps."); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638,
649 (1990) ("A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of
administrative authority."); see also Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating
Interpretationand Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 195 (1992)
("Under this now common view of the theoretical underpinning of judicial deference, the
need for and extent of deference is a function of congressional intent.").
186. Such as when the Communications Act delegated to the Federal
Communications Commission the authority to "execute and enforce" the statute and to

"prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry
out the provisions" of the Act. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
187. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
188. Lovgren v. Locke, 701 F.3d 5, 21 (1st Cir. 2012). See also Sierra Club v.
Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 692 (9th Cir. 2019); Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154,
1159 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Since Chevron, the Supreme Court has clarified what some refer
to as 'step zero' of Chevron: the threshold requirement that an agency interpretation be
of the sort that warrants Chevron analysis in the first instance."); Vullo v. Office of
Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("Courts begin the
multi-step Chevron deference analysis by answering the Chevron 'step zero' question.").

189. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 969 (2005) ("Chevronrequires a federal
court to defer to an agency's construction . . . if the particular statute is within the
agency's jurisdiction to administer, the statute is ambiguous on the point at issue, and
the agency's construction is reasonable.").
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delegation "may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power
to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by
190
some other indication of a comparable congressional intent."

In addition to congressional intent, other additional justifications

for Chevron are agency expertise and the relative political
191
accountability of executive agencies compared to the judiciary.
These secondary justifications also inform Chevron "Step Zero" which
considers "the interpretive method used and the nature of the question

at issue"; 19 2 in that context, the Court has concluded that Chevron
deference is inappropriate for statutory interpretation from nonexpert

agencies 193 as well as decisions on tariff classifications 194 or the scope
of judicial review. 195 Chevron deference is appropriate for agency196
but inappropriate for statutory
promulgated "legislative rules"
interpretations contained only in agency opinion letters, policy
97
statements, agency manuals, or enforcement guidelines.1

190. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) ("It is fair to assume
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when
it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness
and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.").
191. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
("Federal judges - who have no constituency - have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do."). Scholars, of course, disagree about the "real"
justifications for the doctrine. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 191 (1998) ("[T]he [Chevron] Court ultimately
supported its deference principle with two intertwined policy reasons--agency expertise
and democratic accountability."); Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down:
Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 432 (2006)
(Chevron deference is rooted "primarily (but not exclusively) in notions of political
accountability").
192. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
193. The Oregon v. Gonzalez Court found that the Attorney-General's
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act was not an interpretation from an
agency with medical expertise and that Chevron deference would be appropriate only if
the administrative action "reflected the considerable experience and expertise the
[agency] had acquired over time with respect to the complexities of the [statute]." Oregon
v. Gonzalez, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006). See also Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil,
ControllingChevron-Based Delegations,20 CARDOzo L. REV. 989, 1010 (1999) ("Chevron
deference is not appropriate when an agency is asserting authority outside its core
powers.").

194. Where the U.S. Court of International Trade would have equal expertise.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
195. Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2019) ("The scope of judicial review,
meanwhile, is hardly the kind of question that the Court presumes that Congress
implicitly delegated to an agency.").
196. Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 24
(D.C. Cir. 2019)
197. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as
those in opinion letters - like interpretations in policy statements agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not warrant Chevron-style
deference."). But labels are not dispositive. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551
U.S. 158, 174 (2007) (allowing a Department of Labor rule called an "interpretation" to
be entitled to Chevron deference "where the agency uses full notice-and-comment
procedures to promulgate a rule").
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At the other end of the analysis, "Step Two" of Chevron looks to
whether the agency interpretation is "permissible." Many believe that
the Chevron step two inquiry "is all but toothless,"1 98 which might be

true except when Chevron confronts CharmingBetsy.
B. Views that Chevron Should Trump
Some believe that broad and extensive Chevron deference is
desirable for the administrative state; among these commentators,

there are those who argue that Chevron deference should particularly
have more traction when the executive branch is managing the foreign

affairs of the country. Two such proposals warrant discussion.
One of the most sustained critiques of the Charming Betsy in
relation to the Chevron doctrine and executive power comes from a
2007 article by Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein.1 99 The Posner/Sunstein

view was that all of what they call "international relations
doctrines" 200 should give way to Chevron-style deference to executive
interpretations of statutes that concern foreign affairs. Their rationale

is that the executive "is in the best position to balance the competing
interests" of the nation20 1 and that the executive "has better
information about the consequences of violating international law." 202
They believe that the Charming Betsy canon should have little or no
role "in cases in which the executive has adopted an interpretation via
rulemaking or adjudication, or is otherwise entitled to deference under
standard principles of administrative law."2 0 3
The overall Posner/Sunstein proposal drew criticism when it was
published on the grounds that it "would radically expand the authority
of the executive to interpret and, in effect, to break foreign relations
law,"20 4 a criticism that carries more sting after the experience of the

Trump presidency. But for people who care about the rule of law
globally, something always seemed amiss in the Posner/Sunstein
proposal. By lumping CharmingBetsy with "comity" doctrines, Posner
and Sunstein are led to think that Charming Betsy's "conventional

explanation" is to avoid giving offense to "foreign sovereigns" 205 or that

198. Mohon v. Agentra, LLC, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1220 (D.N.M. 2019). ("Courts
essentially never conclude that an agency's interpretation of an unclear statute is
unreasonable."). See also Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial
Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental

Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 775 (2008) ("Due to the difficulty in defining step two,
courts rarely strike down agency action under step two.").
199. See generally Posner & Sunstein supra note 61.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1204; see also id. at 1198 ("The international relations doctrines should

not operate as constraints on the executive under Chevron Step One.").

204. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 7, at 1233.
205. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1175.
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a "common explanation" of Charming Betsy is to "avoid unnecessary
entanglements with foreign states"20 6 and to "reduce the risk that
courts will inadvertently cause foreign policy tensions or crises by
207
offending other nations."
While it may be true that our country being perceived as
complying with international law should "reduce the risk" of foreign
policy tensions, Charming Betsy is not a doctrine for "deferring to

foreign sovereigns"2 08 as true comity doctrines are. 209 For example,
Posner and Sunstein write that Charming Betsy "requires courts to
determine what international law is and such determinations will
210
implying
often require a court to evaluate the acts of foreign states,"

that

such

determinations

might

produce

"tensions"

or

"entanglements." But what "acts of foreign states" are we talking about
when the case will involve the application of a US statute? It is true
that determinations of customary international law or interpretations

of vague treaty provisions could be based on the acts of foreign states,
but this will be rare (not "often") and it will be state actions in the

aggregate. Focus on the acts of one or two states would typically be
used to defeat the existence of an international legal norm-and, if
there is no international norm, the Charming Betsy doctrine would

have no traction at all.
Curtis Bradley has offered another approach that prioritizes
Chevron. Bradley pushes back against what he perceives as an

"unrealistic" separation of law and policy, identifying CharmingBetsy
21
with an "insistence on a pure 'rule of law' approach." 1 He concludes
that the Charming Betsy canon "should not trump Chevron
deference,
212

at least where there is a 'controlling executive act.'

If a court is confronted with an unclear international obligation, it

will naturally look to the views of the executive branch on the question.
But how much should the court defer to those views? Bradley proposes
that treaty interpretation itself (not statutory interpretation) should be
subject to a kind of Chevron deference, proposing that Chevron
provides "a framework for understanding and controlling deference in

206. Id. at 1183.
207. Id. at 1184.
208. Id. at 1185.
209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 40, § 101 cmt. e ("Comity has been
variously conceived and defined. A well-known definition is: 'Comity, in the legal sense,
is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws."').
210. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1185.
211. Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 93, at 651; see also id. at 667 ("It is
not clear, however, that foreign affairs law can be neatly divorced from foreign affairs.").
212. Id. at 679.
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what is an otherwise very amorphous area."2 13 Bradley reasons that in
the first step of Charming Betsy (determining the content of the
international legal obligation), the court would give deference to the
executive agency's interpretation of a treaty or CIL where the Chevron
conditions are met- declining any deference where the court finds

"that the plain language of the treaty clearly resolves the issue, or if
the executive branch's interpretation is unreasonable" and, past those
conditions, only giving deference when "the agency in question is
charged with administering the treaty."2 14

As an analogy, this is fine, partly because the court's independent
judgment as to the likely range of meanings for the ambiguous treaty
provision is already present in the determination if "the executive
branch's interpretation is unreasonable." Yet actually applying

Chevron would not make sense because the cornerstone assumption of
Chevron is that Congress intended to delegate its law-making
authorityto an expert agency. But a treaty is not the product of a single
legislature; it is "an agreement among sovereign powers"2 15 and the

interpretation of any treaty depends not on the unilateral intent of the
United States' Senate (or Congress), but on the "shared expectations of
the contracting parties,"2 16 determined by the text, negotiations,
drafting history, and the "'the postratification understanding' of
signatory nations." 2 17 This is even truer with CIL, where there is
literally no interpretative or law-making authority to delegate. To the

degree that CIL is federal common law, that simply galvanizes the
conclusion that its interpretation is primarily a matter for courts.
C. A Nuanced Interactionof Chevron and Charming Betsy

Instead of a view that simply sweeps away inconvenient canons of
interpretation because the executive "is in the best position to balance
the competing interests" of the nation, one can attempt a more formal
analysis of the interaction between the two doctrines. It can be
presented schematically as follows:

213. Id. at 674; see also Evan Criddle, Chevron Deference and Treaty
Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1929 (2003) (describing Bradley's proposal as
"analogizing" to Chevron as "a useful framework for disciplining U.S. courts relatively
vague standards for deference to executive treaty interpretations").
214. Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 93, at 703.
215. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)).
216. Michael P. Van Alstine, The JudicialPower and Treaty Delegation, 90 CALIF.
L. REv. 1263, 1301 (2002) (reasons treaties are not like legislative text); Criddle, supra
note 213, at 1930; Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 93, at 705.
217. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (quoting Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 226); see also
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989); Choctaw Nation v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
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STEP 1: Is congressional intent unambiguous in the statute? Assuming

this is the same test as whether the statute is unambiguous, then the
two canons start with the same premise.

YES,
Inquiry ends

NO, there is ambiguity

no CharmingBetsy

no Chevron
STEP 2: Is there a relevant international legal norm, and what is its
content?

NO,
No possible conflict
no CharmingBetsy
possible Chevron

YES, relevant norm exists

STEP 3: Does the executive branch interpretation satisfy Chevron step
Zero? (Analysis of Congressional delegation, agency expertise, and
procedural aspects of the agency decision)
NO,

YES, satisfies Chevron Step Zero

no Chevron

POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF CANONS

possible CharmingBetsy
STEP 4:

Is

the executive

branch interpretation

a

permissible

construction of the statute?
If one gets this far, this is where one must decide if and how

CharmingBetsy applies. Let us review the steps.
The First Step
The first step is needed by both doctrines: the court must
determine whether the federal statute at issue is ambiguous, both by

the terms of the Chevron doctrine and the Charming Betsy canon. If
the statute is unambiguous, then neither doctrine has any claim to a
role in the court's decision.
But this raises two issues. First, is a statute being "silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue" under Chevron the same
thing as multiple "possible interpretations" of a statute under
CharmingBetsy? It is reasonable to think the answer is yes, but this
raises the question whether in "Step One" of Chevron congressional

intent must be expressed to be "clear" or whether there are implicit
congressional intentions that are "clear" enough by the lights of

Chevron to negate delegation of interpretative authority to executive
agencies. Chevron itself seems to require explicit expression of
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intent, 2 1 8 but Justice Breyer concurring in the 2013 City of Arlington

v. FCC case believed that clear congressional intent making Chevron
inapplicable can be found otherwise:
[T]he statute's text, its context, the structure of the statutory scheme, and canons
of textual construction are relevant in determining whether the statute is
ambiguous . . . . Statutory purposes, including those revealed in part by

legislative and regulatory history, can be similarly relevant. 2 19

If Breyer's view is correct, where Congress indicated that it was
passing legislation, in whole or in part, to address US obligations in
human rights, international trade, criminal law, intellectual property,

or environmental protection (to name a few), is that enough to render
the statute unambiguous "with respect to [a] specific issue" and keep

the problem outside Chevron?
This was the plurality analysis in the Court's I.N.S.

v. Cardoza-

Fonseca decision: that in its 1980 amendments to US immigration law

"one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee
law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating

to the Status of Refugees," 220 a United States treaty commitment. On
that basis, the administration's interpretation of a "well-founded fear"
for establishing refugee status was rejected as inconsistent with the
clear intent of the statute, i.e., a clear intent to abide by a particular
international legal norm to which the United States had subscribed. 22 1

218. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986
(2005) ("At the first step, [the Court] ask[s] whether the statute's plain terms 'directly
addres[s] the precise question at issue."') (quoting Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). See id. at 982 (deriving clear Congressional intent "from the
unambiguous terms of the statute").
219. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part).

220. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436
(1987). Similarly, in a pair of cases from the 1980s the issue was whether a stateless boat
in international waters was properly intercepted and its crewmen indicted for conspiracy
to possess and distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955(a). United States v.
James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981); United States v. MarinoGarcia, 679 F.2d. 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 1983). Both court found that the legislative
history of Section 955a clearly showed that Congress intended to extend jurisdiction only
to the "maximum ... permitted under international law." James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp.
at 1343 ("Congress intended for the Marijuana on the High Seas Act to give the
'maximum prosecutorial authority permitted under international law."'); Marino-Garcia,
679 F.2d. at 1380. While Congressional intent concerning 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) was clear,
the Eleventh Circuit panel noted that if that intent had not been clear, CharmingBetsy
would apply: "Moreover, even had the intent of Congress been less than pellucid, the
Supreme Court has long admonished that 'an act of congress ought never to be construed

to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains....' Id. at 1380
(citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804) and Weinberger v. Rossi,
456 U.S. 25 (1982)).
221. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 436-37. Not only did the statutory definition of
"refugee" track the Protocol "but there were also many statements indicating Congress'
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Second Step
In the second step-necessary to Charming Betsy, not Chevronthe court determines whether there is a relevant international legal

norm and, if so, the contents of that norm. If there is no relevant
international legal norm, then there is no Charming Betsy analysis.
This is where we must decide how much deference the court will give

to the executive branch views as to the potential international
obligation-and this elicits one of the Chevron rationales: agency

expertise. On the basis of expertise, courts already recognize that
executive branch interpretations as entitled to "respect," "great
weight," and "deference."2 2 2
Should they do more, adopting Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of treaty obligations? To the degree that treaties are
legal instruments, the answer would be no: courts consider themselves
23
especially capable at interpreting written documents. 2 And to the
degree a treaty's meaning depends on the "post-ratification

understanding" of signatory nations, that is a question of public

behavior easily presented as evidence to the court.2 24 Express adoption
of Chevron deference to executive interpretations of US treaty
commitments would also be a bad precedent for other countries,
signaling that courts in those countries should also cede ground to

executive interpretation of treaties. Meanwhile, at home, it would be a
treatment without a disease. There are no glaring examples of the

intent that the new statutory definition of 'refugee' be interpreted in conformance with
the Protocol's definition." Id. at 437.
222. See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 513 ("[T]he United States' interpretation of a
treaty 'is entitled to great weight."'); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S.
176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty
provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement
is entitled to great weight."); see El Al Isr. Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155,
168 (1999) ("Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch
concerning the meaning of an international treaty."); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S.
353, 369 (1989) (giving "great weight" to "IRS's construction" of a tax treaty); Kolovrat v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the
meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276, 295 (1933) ("of weight"); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985)
("considerable deference"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 40, at § 326(2)
("Courts ... will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch.");
BREYER, supra note 9, at 169 ("One particular feature of treaty interpretation is that the
Court will often give special weight to the views of the Department of State, which ...
may understand better what the signatories had in mind.").
223. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) ("The
construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are
likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.").
224. In Medellin v. Texas, the Court bolstered its own interpretation of the various
treaties by pointing out that 47 nations were party to one treaty and 171 nations party
to another, but the defendant and amici could not identify "a single nation" conducting
itself pursuant to the defendant's interpretation. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 516.

1193

THE CHARMING BETSY CANON

20201

world going amiss because federal judges do not expressly embrace
Chevron in relation to treaties; the Skidmore deference 225 that courts
give agencies for their "specialized experience and broader
investigations and information" 226 should be more than an adequate

basis for the executive to persuade the court for its own interpretation
of a treaty obligation.

Third Step
In the third step, the court needs to conduct the Chevron "Step
Zero" analysis, determining whether this agency in reaching this
interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. If the answer is no,
then, again, there is no conflict between the doctrines. If the answer is

yes, then we finally have a potential conflict between Chevron and
CharmingBetsy.
Fourth Step
It is at this fourth step-where one will conduct "Step Two" of
Chevron-that CharmingBetsy does or does not play a role. The "Step
Two" question at this point is whether the executive interpretation "is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."
Here a court should still use Charming Betsy to conclude that an

executive interpretation of a statute that puts the United States in
violation

of

international

obligations

is

"capricious"

or

not

"reasonable." 22 7 As one Commerce Department attorney described,
"the reviewing court, as an aid to assessing the reasonablenessof the
agency's interpretation, may turn to a pertinent international
obligation of the United States, and construe the statute in harmony
with it, if possible." 228 Restani and Bloom also effectively recommend

this sort of approach when they propose that if "the statute is intended
to implement the [international] agreement . . . the relevant WTO

agreement may be viewed as secondary legislative history" and on that

225. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
226. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
227. The two words reflect the bifurcated standard in Chevron between when
Congress has explicitly left "gaps" for an agency to fill and when it has impliedly left
such gaps. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) ("If Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.").

228. Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Chevron Deference and The CharmingBetsy: Is There
a Place for the Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and
CountervailingDuty Determinations?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 229, 232 (2003-2004).
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basis "an agency interpretation contrary to clear WTO language

229
probably should be considered 'manifestly contrary to the statute."'
Let us return to Cardoza-Fonseca, discussed above. CardozaFonseca was technically not a Charming Betsy case: the plurality
concluded that Congress' intent was express and that compliance with
a specific treaty "provided the motivation for the enactment of the
Refugee Act of 1980."230 That express intent took the analysis out of
Chevron at Chevron "Step One" and/or would make the
administration's interpretation "impermissible" under Chevron "Step
Two."

emphasized

Cardoza-Fonseca also

congressional

intent "[e]mploying

that

courts

determine

traditional tools of statutory

construction," 23 1 and the Charming Betsy canon is one of the most

unimpeachable of those "traditional tools." So, can we just use the
background

presumption

of

congressional

intent

to

abide

by

international legal obligations as the grounds to conclude that the
executive branch action is "impermissible" under this fourth step

(which is Chevron "Step Two")?
There is much in "Step Two" Chevron jurisprudence that would
allow this approach. For example, consider Justice Scalia's formulation
in City of Arlington v. FCC: "[w]here Congress has established a clear
line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has
established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the

ambiguity will fairly allow."2 32 As CharmingBetsy is an interpretative
canon as to what to do with such ambiguities, CharmingBetsy does not
"fairly allow" a statutory interpretation in contravention of our

international obligations. After all, the "reasonableness" here is "a
233
and one can view
reasonable policy choice for the agency to make"

229. Restani & Bloom, supra note 174, at 1543; see also Roger P. Alford, Federal
Courts, InternationalTribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675,
739-40 (2003) (concluding that "the [CharmingBetsy] presumption that Congress does
not intend to act in a manner inconsistent with international law leads to the corollary
that a Chevron step two analysis leaves no room for a construction that is not consistent
with an international obligation").
230. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987).
But as Steinhardt notes, the plurality decision is Charming Betsy-like because a
statutory provision ""was interpreted not in accordance with jurisdictional norms but
under substantive principles of international refugee law," Steinhardt, supra note 8 at
1156, and that "the actual result reflects a predisposition to interpret a mixed legislative
history to maximize respect for international norms." Id. at 1165.
231. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 446. In City of Arlington v. FCC, Justice Breyer
used this phrase to describe the Chevron inquiry as follows: "The judge, considering
'traditional tools of statutory construction,' [Cardoza-Fonseca] will ask whether
Congress has spoken unambiguously. If so, the text controls. If not, the judge will ask
whether Congress would have intended the agency to resolve the resulting ambiguity."
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
232. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added).
233. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
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discretionary interpretations of domestic law that put us in violation
of international law as both "unreasonable" and "capricious."

VI.CHARMING BETSY AND THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF WTO DECISIONS

After the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, perhaps no
single event "thickened" international law more than the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. With approximately 60
agreements of different sorts totaling 550 pages of text (without
including national tariff bindings), 234 WTO law provides a different
sort of terrain, both for determining when we have an unambiguous
international legal norm and for whether and when Congress may have
given special contours to the application of CharmingBetsy. When the
question is simply consistency of US statutory law with the textual

obligations of any one of the WTO Agreements, courts should proceed
as usual-looking for a clear treaty obligation and an ambiguous

domestic law. But matters become complicated when the WTO
obligation at issue has been the subject of a "dispute settlement"
process.
The WTO was founded with a particularly adjudicatory approach
to resolving disagreements as to compliance with treaty obligations.
Under the WTO's "Dispute Settlement Understanding" (DSU), any
WTO jurisdiction can bring another jurisdiction before a "panel" of
arbitrators appointed to resolve whether the respondent's domestic law
meets its WTO obligations. 235 A WTO Member unhappy with the

"panel report" can take an appeal to the DSU "Appellate Body." 236
Although the appellate portion of "dispute settlement" has become
paralyzed because of actions (or inaction) by the Obama and Trump
administrations, 237 there remains an enormous body of decisions
rendered from 1995 to 2019-and panels at least continue to issue

decisions. While all these decisions do not constitute a formal system

234. See
generally
WTO
legal
texts,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/legale.htm (last visited July 28, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Y4XF-QHK7] (archived July 28, 2020).
235. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, art. 4, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1228-29 [hereinafter Dispute
Settlement Understanding].
236. Id. art. 17.
237. Justin Hughes, Globalization, Revising the Terms of Trade, and the Return of
'History,'14OHIO STATE BUS. L. J. 15, 62 (2020) (recognizing paralysis of WTO Appellate
Body as a strategy that started under Obama Administration); Alan Beattie, U.S. is
about to cripple the World Trade Organization'sdispute-settlingsystem, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2019, at https://www.latimes.comfbusiness/storv/2019-12-09/us-to-criuple-worldtrade-organizations-appeals-system.
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of stare decisis,238 commentators tend to treat WTO decisions as a de
facto system of precedent. That practice is understandable, but masks
substantial complexity that bears on how the Charming Betsy canon
may interact with WTO jurisprudence.

A. Was the United States the Respondent in the Dispute?
For a panel or Appellate Body report to become final and effective
it must go to the collective WTO membership meeting as the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB): the DSB can, by consensus, reject any

report. 23 9 Thus, one could argue that where a panel or appellate
decision is not rejected by the DSB, it has been accepted by the WTO
membership-and arguably becomes a "subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of [a WTO] treaty"
240
under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
But this view of WTO processes was definitively rejected early in
the organization's existence.

In the 1996 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic

Beverages dispute 241 the Appellate Body concluded that DSU decisions
could not be considered "agreements" of the WTO Contracting Parties

because of the history of the GATT, 242 specific provisions of the WTO

238. See Seastrum, supra note 228, at 233; Corus Staal I, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253,
1264 n.17 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (citation omitted) ("While commentators argue that there
is de facto stare decisis within the WTO and that future panels do in fact follow previous
decisions, . . . the fact remains that these decisions have no express legal effect beyond
the boundaries of the particular case.") modified, 279 F. Supp.2d 1363 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2003), and 283 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), aff'd, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
239. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 235, art. 16(4) ("Within 60
days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be
adopted at a DSB meeting (7) unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of
its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report."); id. art.
17(14) ("An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally
accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt
the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the Members.").
240. Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
interpretation of a treaty's provisions may take account of "(a) any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions" as well as "(b) any subsequent practice in the application of
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), opened for signatureMay 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 33.
241. Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Does. WT/DS8/R,
WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996), modified, Appellate Body Report,
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 12, WTO Docs. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body, Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages].

242. Appellate Body, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 241, at 13 ("The
generally-accepted view under GATT 1947 was that the conclusions and
recommendations in an adopted panel report bound the parties to the dispute in that
particular case, but subsequent panels did not feel legally bound by the details and
reasoning of a previous panel report.").

20201

THE CHARMING BETSY CANON

1197

Agreements that reserve "interpretations" of the treaties to treaty
assembly bodies, 24 3 and the DSU's own provision reserving the "rights

of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a
covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO
Agreement." 244 The upshot of this 1996 decision is that, stricto senso, a
decision from the DSU process interprets treaty obligations only for the
disputing parties.
That means that the first question is whether the WTO decision
at issue concerned a specific American law (meaning the United States
was the respondent in the WTO dispute). If the United States was not
the respondent in the dispute, even if a WTO decision seems to address
the content of a US domestic law, the WTO decision technically does
not establish an international obligation of the United States; it only
signals what the international obligation would be in some subsequent
WTO dispute involving the United States. Even commentators wellversed in international law sometimes overlook this point. 245

243. See id. ("Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement provides: 'The Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements."'). Such
decisions require a three-fourths majority, although consensus would likely be needed in
practice. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation

Under Article XI:2 of the Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization:Current
Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 803, 805-06 (2005).
244. Appellate Body, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 241, at 14 (quoting
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 235, art. 3.9). Few now question that
"interpretations and findings developed within reports of the DSM only bind parties in
the context of a specific dispute." See Cosette D. Creamer & Zuzanna Godzimirska,
Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization:A FunctionalSubstitute
for Authoritative Interpretations4 (Univ. of Copenhagen, Working Paper No. 9, 2014)
(suggesting a proactive views of Members to aid in the functioning of the DSM to "fulfill
obligations to all WTO Members" (emphasis in original)); Petros C. Mavroidis,
Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 421, 464 (2008) ("As a
formal matter, WTO panel and AB reports, like GATT panel reports before, bind only
the parties to the particular dispute and do not create binding precedent."). But there
are plenty of observers prepared to argue that the DSU is developing into a precedential
or quasi-precedential system. See, e.g., Alec S. Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee
Courts and the Judicializationof International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian
Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and the
World Trade Organization, 1 J.L. & CTS. 61, 62 (2013) (characterizing DSU decisions as
"virtually impossible" for WTO Members to reverse); Zhu Lanye, The Effects of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body
Resolving Specific Disputes Only or Making Precedent at the Same Time?, 17 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 221, 230 (2003) ("If we regard precedents as decisions furnishing a basis
for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues we can say without

heistations that large amounts of such precedents exist in the WTO dispute settlement
system.").
245. See, e.g., Restani & Bloom, supra note 174, at 1544-47 (discussing how to
address WTO decisions without drawing this distinction); Lisa P. Ramsay, Free Speech
and InternationalObligations To Protect Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 455-58
(describing "binding" rules or "new rule[s]" being created in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings).
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For example, in the Federal Circuit's 2004 Timken Co. v. United

States decision, 246 the issue was whether the U.S. Department of
Commerce properly calculated dumping margins against imports of

Japanese roller bearings. 24 7 In a dumping case, shipments of an
imported product have allegedly been sold at an "export price" that is

less than "normal value," i.e., some shipments of a product were
"dumped" into the US market at a loss. Additional tariffs are imposed
to bring the market price of the product up to the normal value.
But other shipments of the same product (during the same period)
may have been imported at greater than normal value, i.e., typical
commercial transactions. This leads to the question: Should those

profitable shipments be offset against the "dumped" unprofitable
shipments? In Timken, the importers contested Commerce's practice of
"zeroing" the profitable import shipments-that

is, not allowing

shipments sold at a profit to be offset against shipments sold at a loss.
In other words, Commerce took the view that all shipments into the

United States should be normal, for-profit transactions.
The Federal Circuit concluded that Commerce's "zeroing" practice,
249
was a
while not mandated by the statute, 248 "makes sense,"
permissible interpretation of the statute, and warranted Chevron
deference. 250 In other words, having determined that the statutory

provision was ambiguous, 251 the Timken court relied on a Chevron
analysis to embrace Commerce's interpretation.

The importer, Koyo Seiko, argued that the practice of "zeroing" in
dumping investigations had been held impermissible by the WTO

Appellate Body. That 2001 decision, EC-Bed Linens, 25 2 had concerned
a dispute between India and the then-European Communities (EC)

over duties on bed sheets. 253 Koyo reasoned "that the EC and United
States have functionally identical practices that demand similar
treatment," 254 such that Commerce should bring its own procedures
into line with the WTO decision. The Federal Circuit's response to this
argument was muddled, relying mainly on the distinction between an

246. Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
247. Id. at 1337.
248. Id. at 1342.
249. Id. ("This approach makes sense; it neutralizes dumped sales and has no
effect on fair-value sales.").
250. Id. at 1343 ("According Commerce its proper deference, we hold that it
reasonably interpreted § 1677(35)(A) to allow for zeroing.").
251. See SNR Roulements v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1345-46 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2004) (holding that the statute does not unambiguously mandate zeroing);
Serapore Indus. Pvt., Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 675 F. Supp. 1354, 1360
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
252. See generally Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Antidumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS141/AB/R
(adopted Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Bed Linen].
253. Timken Co., 354 F.3d at 1343.
254. Id. at 1344.
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"antidumping investigation" (what was at issue in the India/EC
dispute at the WTO) and "an administrative review of dumping" (the
dispute before the court). 255
The better analysis in Timken would have been to explain that the
WTO Appellate Body's interpretation of a WTO treaty provision in a
dispute that did not involve the United States had not crystallized the
treaty obligation vis-a-vis the United States. In other words, the
United States' obligation in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement
remained as vague as it had been before the EC-Bed Linens
decision. 256 This is the formal teaching of the Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages analysis: decisions of WTO panels and the

appellate body are not "authoritative interpretation[s]" of the WTO
obligations applicable to all members and must be distinguished from
consensus agreements reached by GATT and WTO working groups,
committees, Councils, or Ministerial Conferences. 25 7
In contrast, a DSU decision does express an international legal
norm to which the United States becomes bound when the United

States has been the respondent in a completed WTO dispute, and that
dispute concerned the domestic American law now before the domestic
court. In that case, the DSU decision may have converted what was an
otherwise ambiguous obligation into one which has more certain
content. If a US statute is found to be inconsistent with that newly
crystallized obligation then it is up to the political branches to either

(1) get amendment of the obligation at the WTO, or (2) change the
domestic law. But if (a) the US statutory law is ambiguous, and (b) it
was applied by the executive branch in a WTO-inconsistent manner,
and (c) the United States is not seeking to change the WTO
obligation, 25 8 then one might think it is time for courts to apply

CharmingBetsy.

.

255. Id. at 1344-45
256. The Court of International Trade made this point properly the year before.
PAM S.p.A. v. United States Dep't of Com., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1372 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2003) ("WTO panel and appellate decisions are non-binding on third parties.").
257. For example, in Luigi Bormioli Corp., Inc. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2002), the Federal Circuit properly considered three GATT
agreements/decisions as clarifying the United States' obligations under the GATT: the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402 (also called the "GATT Valuation Code"), id. at
1366; the Decision of the Treatment of Interest Charges in the Customs Value of

Imported Goods, GATT Committee on Customs Valuation, April 26, 1984, id. at 1368;
and a 1994 Interpretative Note to Article 1, "Price Actually Paid or Payable" id. at 1367
n.3. Since the United States participated in and agreed to these, they qualify under
Vienna Article 31 as subsequent agreements among the parties informing the substance
of the international obligations.
258. That is, the U.S. has not appealed a panel decision nor made efforts to trigger
renegotiation of the WTO obligation through the WTO General Council and Ministerial
Conference. Cosette Creamer and Zuzanna Godzimirska have studied the number of

statements made by WTO Members on DSB adoption of panel and Appellate Body
decision. Not surprisingly, the United States leads the pack with 169 statements made
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Congress, however, has added another layer of process-and
courts have only infrequently opined on the effect of these additional
provisions.

B. The Statutory Scheme to Address Adverse WTO Rulings
Congress implemented the WTO Agreements through the
"Uruguay Round Agreements Act" (URAA). 259 Among a multitude of
changes in US law, the URAA established three specific procedures to
reconcile US domestic law with WTO decisions ("WTO reconciliation
provisions"). These provisions have been characterized as a
"comprehensive scheme for the Executive Branch . . . to determine
26 0
whether and how to implement an adverse WTO report."
The first provision lays out a general process: 19 U.S.C. § 3533(f)

provides that in the case of a panel or Appellate Body report "adverse
to the United States" the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is to
promptly "consult with the appropriate congressional committees
concerning whether to implement the report's recommendation and, if

so, the manner of such implementation and the period of time needed
for such implementation." 261 While written in general terms, this

subsection seems directed to WTO decisions against US statutory
provisions.
Section 3533(f) is followed by

§ 3533(g) which governs situations

in which a WTO "dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds
in its report that a regulation or practice of a department or agency of
the United States is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements." 262 In such situations, "that regulation or practice may
not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified" until USTR has
undertaken various consultations and "the head of the relevant
department or agency has provided an opportunity for public comment
by publishing in the Federal Register the proposed modification and

the explanation for the modification."2 6 3

1995-2012. Creamer & Godzimirska, supra note 244, at 26. But in none of those
statements did the United States say it would refuse to comply with a final DSB outcome
(whether Appellate Body decision or unappealed panel decision). According to Creamer
and Godzimirska, "[p]arties to a dispute typically reiterate legal arguments made within
their submissions and highlight particular report findings or procedural aspects with
which they strongly agree or that they find problematic." Id. at 15.
259. See generally Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-465, 108
Stat. 4809.
260. Appellate Body, United States Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS264/AB.R (adopted Mar. 9, 2007) [hereinafter
US-Softwood Lumber] (U.S. Department of Commerce argument, citing September 28,
2004 Transcript at 147).
261. 19 U.S.C. § 3533(0 (2018).
262. Id. § 3533(g)(1).
263. Id. § 3533(g)(1), (1)(A)-(F) (describing multi-step process of consultations with
"appropriate congressional committees" and "relevant private sector advisory
committees"; "head of the relevant department or agency" providing opportunities for
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The third provision-19 U.S.C. § 3538-addresses WTO
determinations that "an action by the International Trade Commission
in connection with a particular proceeding is not in conformity with the
[WTO] obligations of the United States" in relation to antidumping,
countervailing, and safeguard measures. 264 In addition to these three
provisions, the URAA codified 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) that "[n]o provision
of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements nor the application of any
such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with
any law of the United States shall have effect."
What is the relationship of these WTO reconciliation procedures
to the Charming Betsy doctrine? One might conclude that Congress
intended to override Charming Betsy in regard to WTO dispute
settlement
decisions-that courts should uphold any WTO-

inconsistent regulations or interpretations of statutes until the
statutory-described processes have worked to bring US domestic law
into alignment with WTO rules. If one believes that the Charming
Betsy canon is grounded only in congressional intent, one could reason
that the URAA's "comprehensive scheme" makes Charming Betsy
inapplicable to this area of trade law; similarly, one who believes that
the canon is grounded in separation of powers might conclude that the
URAA shows an intent by the political branches that Article III courts
not meddle in WTO issues.

This is arguably how a Federal Circuit panel approached the
issues in Corus Staal BV v. Department of Commerce.265 The Corus
Staal case involved essentially the same dispute as the earlier Timken

"zeroing
Commerce's
(discussed above) concerning
decision
methodology" in antidumping cases. 266 But between Timken (decided
in March 2004) and Corus Staal (decided in May 2005), the WTO
Appellate Body had issued an opinion directly addressing the US

practice, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada(decided 11 August 2004).267 In other words, as
of the time of the Federal Circuit's deliberation, a final WTO decision
binding on the United States had found "that the United States acted
inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in
determining the existence of margins of dumping on the basis of a
'zeroing."' 26 8

methodology incorporating the practice of

public comment on any change in regulation or practice; further consultations with
Congressional committees; and publication in the Federal Register).
264. Id. § 3538.
265. See generally Corus Staal BV v. United States Dep't of Com., 395 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
266. Id. at 1346.
267. See generally US-Softwood Lumber, supra note 260.
268. US-Softwood Lumber, supra note 260, 1 117.
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Yet the appellate panel took the view that the issue had already
been decided in Timken; 269 that as to any intervening WTO decisions,
"WTO decisions are 'not binding on the United States, much less this
court"'; 2 70 and that "if U.S. statutory provisions are inconsistent with

the GATT or an enabling agreement, it is strictly a matter for
Congress." 271
This was a case where CharmingBetsy might have been brought
to bear by a willing court. Instead, the panel found that the statute in
question was ambiguous and, per Chevron, upheld the Commerce
Department's methodology on the grounds that "[i]n recognition of
Commerce's expertise in the field of antidumping investigations, we

accord deference to its statutory interpretation in the presence of
ambiguity." 272 The court expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument
"that Commerce unreasonably refused to interpret the statute in a
manner consistent with U.S. international obligations under the

Charming Betsy doctrine." 273 In the fourth step of the
Chevron/Charming Betsy interaction proposed above, the Federal
Circuit panel declined to consider that the Commerce Department
interpretation was not a Chevron "reasonable" construction because it
now conflicted with a clarified international legal obligation of the
274
United States. Indeed, the appellate court held just the opposite.
Of course, there are other perspectives on how Charming Betsy
can or should interact with the WTO reconciliation provisions of the

URAA. That § 3533(g) provides an elaborate notice-and-comment
process before which "that regulation or practice may not be amended,
rescinded, or otherwise modified" says nothing about courts upholding
or overturning "that regulation or practice." Similarly, the § 3533(f)

reconciliation provision for statutes requires only that USTR "consult
with the appropriate congressional committees" on whether "to
implement the [WTO] report's recommendation" without limiting the
timing or scope of Article III court review. So, where a DSB proceeding
has found a US statutory law to be inconsistent with WTO

269. Corus Staal BV, 395 F.3d at 1347 ("Our decision in Timken addressed
Commerce's interpretation of section 1677(35); it is of no consequence that it was decided
in the context of a review. Therefore, Timken governs, and the Court of International
Trade was correct to find Commerce's zeroing methodology permissible in the context of
administrative investigations.").
270. Id. at 1348.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1346.
273. Id. at 1347.
274. Noting that "the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution
to the political departments of the Federal Government," the panel concluded "[w]e will
not attempt to perform duties that fall within the exclusive province of the political
branches, and we therefore refuse to overturn Commerce's zeroing practice based on any
ruling by the WTO or other international body unless and until such ruling has been
adopted pursuant to the specified statutory scheme." Id. at 1349. The same reasoning
was followed in Dillinger France S.A. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1349 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2018).
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commitments and that law is sufficiently ambiguous that it is
genuinely susceptible to a WTO-compliant interpretation, a court could
arguably use Charming Betsy to arrive at that interpretation-even
while USTR and Capitol Hill might be in the midst of their
consultations.
Interestingly, the third WTO reconciliation provision-addressing
International Trade Commission (ITC) determinations-reads like its
own application of the CharmingBetsy canon. Section 3538(a) provides
that in the face of problematic ITC action, USTR
may request the Commission to issue an advisory report on whether title VII of
the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C.A. § 1671 et seq.] or title II of the Trade Act of
1974 [19 U.S.C.A. § 2251 et seq.], as the case may be, permits the Commission to
take steps in connection with the particular proceeding that would render its

action not inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body
concerning those obligations. The Trade Representative shall notify the
congressional committees of such request. 275

In keeping with the reasoning in this Article, § 3538(a) can be
understood as asking the ITC to reexamine one of its own
interpretations of US trade laws in light of an international obligation
newly clarified or crystallized by a WTO dispute settlement panel or

appellate report; the statutory goal is to reach a decision "not
inconsistent with the findings of the [dispute settlement] panel or the
Appellate Body concerning [US] obligations." In other words, § 3538(a)

asks the ITC to apply CharmingBetsy.
Even if one believes that the URAA provisions curtail some
application of Charming Betsy, the canon can still be applied in a
"clean-up" role. One example of this is the Federal Circuit's 2004
decision in Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States.27 6 Allegheny

Ludlum concerned a "same-person methodology" used by the
Department of Commerce to determine whether the effects of a onetime subsidy to a French company, Unisor, survived the company's sale
by stock privatization. In 2002, the same-person methodology was
struck down by the Court of International Trade as inconsistent with

the statute. 277 Separately, the same-person methodology was found to
violate the United States' WTO commitments in a DSU decision. 2 78 In
response, Commerce implemented a new "privatization methodology"
to determine the effects of one-time subsidies; it implemented this new
regulation pursuant to § 3533(g). The new "privatization methodology"

275. 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a) (2018).
276. See generally Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
277. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1366-69 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2002).
278. Appellate Body, United States-CountervailingMeasures ConcerningCertain
Products from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS212/AB/R (adopted Jan. 8,
2003).
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was to be applied to countervailing duty investigations initiated after

June 30, 2003.279 Nonetheless, Commerce sought to continue use of the
older "same-person methodology" for the ongoing Unisor investigation.
Relying on both the statute and its legislative history, the

appellate panel affirmed that the statute forbade use of the "sameperson methodology." Given that the court found clarity in the
statute,2 8 0 the decision could have ended there. Instead, the court
bolstered their statutory readings with the Charming Betsy canon:
"[m]oreover, this court's interpretation of § 1677(5) avoids unnecessary
conflict between domestic law and the international obligations of this

country." 281 The Federal Circuit was correct in this: since in a dispute
involving the United States law, the WTO "specifically rejected the
argument that sales of assets should be treated differently from sales
282
that interpretation
of stocks for assessing countervailing duties,"
283
had indeed become "an international obligation[s] of this country."

The § 3533(g) process had produced a prospective alignment of
domestic statute and WTO obligation; the Federal Circuit endorsed
using Charming Betsy to produce a retroactive alignment between
domestic statute and WTO obligation.
If one believes the URAA provisions do not force the Charming
Betsy canon to retire from the field completely, then Allegheny Ludlum
Corp. v. US was correctly decided and the Corus Staal court failed to
understand that a treaty-inconsistent regulation should not be a

"permissible construction" of an ambiguous statute under Chevron.
But one can still think that the Corus Staal panel was right in one

sense-probably not the sense they meant-when they noted that
284
It is the
"WTO decisions are 'not binding on the United States."'
counsel
may
URAA-which
the
WTO-not
of
the
nature
fundamental

against the use of CharmingBetsy in some of these cases.
Most treaty obligations are just that-obligations. This is true of
arms-control treaties, tax treaties, extradition treaties, intellectual
property treaties, etc. But the dispute settlement system of the WTO

279. Allegheny Ludlum, 367 F.3d at 1343.
280. The issue on which the appellate panel focused was whether Commerce had
to treat transfers by asset sale and transfers by stock sale the same, finding that a
disjunctive between two kinds of transfers (a change in ownership of "a foreign
enterprise" versus "the productive assets of a foreign enterprise") "indicates that the law
does not permit Commerce to treat a change of ownership differently based on the form
of the transaction." Id. at 1345. But the legislative history was not as equivocally clear
as the court suggests on whether Commerce would have to use the same methodology for
each type of transaction. Id. at 1346.
281. Id. at 1345. In addtion to citing Charming Betsy, the panel cited its own
precedents on this point, Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1362, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002) and Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
282. Allegheny Ludlum, 367 F.3d at 1345.
283. Id.
284. Corus Staal BV v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
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expressly contemplates defections from WTO obligations, allowing
countries to decide on a certain amount of noncompliance with WTO
trade disciplines without endangering WTO membership or its overall

benefits.
When

§ 3533(f) provides that after an adverse DSU report USTR

will promptly "consult with the appropriate congressional committees
concerning whether to implement the report's recommendation," this
may well express congressional recognition that sometimes the United

States will prefer to defect from a WTO legal norm-and abide by the
WTO meta-norms that a jurisdiction "pay" for the defection from WTO
trade disciplines through lost trade concessions or simple financial

payments. 285 In this sense, one could argue that "WTO decisions are
'not binding on the United States"' until the executive branch in
consultation with Congress decides that they are binding.28 6
For example, a NAFTA arbitration panel took this approach in the

2005 US-Softwood Lumber case. 2 87

In keeping with Allegheny

Ludlum, the arbitral panel concluded that the

§§ 3533/3538 processes

are only for prospective modification of US domestic laws 288 and
employed Charming Betsy to give NAFTA and WTO-compliant
interpretations
determinations.

retroactively
affecting
countervailing
Yet while applying Charming Betsy to

duty
prior

discretionary agency action that was not addressed by a § 3533
reconciliation process, the panel noted that it might have reached a
different analysis if "USTR determined, after appropriate consultation,
to not direct implementation of the DSB's ruling (by paying
compensation or accepting the imposition of sanctions)." 289 When the
US government responds to an adverse WTO report by saying it is

willing to pay compensation or accept loss of trade concessions, the
combination of the WTO dispute settlement decision and the US
government response arguably reshapes that particular WTO

obligation of the United States. This is a sound basis to argue that a
court should not apply the Charming Betsy canon to any WTO
obligation of the United States that has been crystallized or clarified
in a new form until the executive branch, through the §§ 3533/3538
processes, has signaled its acceptance of the newly clarified obligation.

285. 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (2018) (emphasis added).
286. Corus Staal BV, 395 F.3d at 1348.
287. See generally NAFTA Article 1904 Binational Panel Review, In the Matter of
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada - Final Affirmative Antidumping
Determination, Secretariat File USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (June 9, 2005).
288. Id. at 35 ("USTR does not have the power, under Section 129(b)(4) or any
other statute, to direct the Department to implement an adverse DSB decision
retroactively.").
289. Id. at 37.
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VII. CONCLUSION

No one-or almost no one-questions the basic insight of
Charming Betsy that domestic law "ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
The traditional explanations given for the Charming Betsy canon are
based on congressional intent (to abide by international law) and

separation of powers (to keep courts out of foreign affairs). But there is
another explanation: CharmingBetsy is a doctrine by which American
jurists contribute to the global rule of law.
As Stephen Breyer noted, "[b]y engaging the world and the
borderless challenges it presents, we can promote adherence and

adoption to [those] basic constitutional and legal values," values which
we hope to pass to others.29 0 Charming Betsy is part of the proper
posture for that engagement, comporting with the importance that the

American legal system has played on the world stage as a role model.
More than ever, it is in our national interest that courts, bureaucracies,

and enforcement structures in other countries believe that they too
should ensure, whenever possible, that internationally-agreed legal
norms are honored on the ground.
As against the argument that Charming Betsy may unduly

constrain executive power, the proper response is that in the handling
of our country's international relations the Executive branch should

not-in the absence of congressional direction-violate international
law. The interests of the United States in the rule of law globally are
too important to conflate or confuse short-term policy goals with longterm legal obligations, no matter how heated or demagogic the rhetoric
of our election campaigns become.

290.

BREYER, supra note 9, at 246.

